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Control Methods For Recurrent Epidemic Processes
Abstract
In this dissertation, we consider the problem of controlling recurrent epidemic processes.
Such processes are mathematical models of behaviors which spread between collections of
agents due to stochastic events, such as contact between two individuals, and in which
behaviors may be exhibited repeatedly, such as infection with a disease. Such
phenomena occur in several settings. Information is spread through social networks in this
way; diseases are spread through networks of biological agents in this way; malware is spread through
networks of computing devices in this way. In all such contexts, it is desirable to understand how to
interact with the network to control such undesirable behaviors. The results we present address this
issue.
We begin by reviewing the literature, and then develop some techniques for the control of
continuous-time epidemic processes which provide stochastic stability guarantees.
These results are significant, in that they provide advancements in aspects of epidemic control that have
been under investigation for some time. After verifying that the designed controller outperforms a simple
heuristic on an example problem, we take note of the fact that implementing the controller in a practical
setting may be computationally expensive, due to the difficulty of the required optimization. This
motivates a search for computationally tractable control methods.
We thus change focus to considering the control of discrete-time epidemic processes. We develop two
novel controllers. One addresses the issue of mitigating the spread of biological disease by way of
allocating discrete protective resources. The other addresses the issue of optimizing the performance of
a network of devices that are responding to a malware attack. In each case, polynomial-time algorithms
are constructed to implement the controller. This is notable, as the control actions in each case were
taken to be discrete sets with exponentially many elements. Together, these results demonstrate that
there is promise in controlling recurrent epidemic processes in several contexts, where our ability to do so
tractably is most closely tied to the recognition of a special structure in the task under consideration. We
close the dissertation by providing comments on possible directions for future research.
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ABSTRACT
CONTROL METHODS FOR RECURRENT EPIDEMIC PROCESSES
Nicholas J. Watkins
George J. Pappas
In this dissertation, we consider the problem of controlling recurrent epidemic processes.
Such processes are mathematical models of behaviors which spread between collections of
agents due to stochastic events, such as contact between two individuals, and in which
behaviors may be exhibited repeatedly, such as infection with a disease. Such phenomena
occur in several settings. Information is spread through social networks in this way; diseases
are spread through networks of biological agents in this way; malware is spread through
networks of computing devices in this way. In all such contexts, it is desirable to understand
how to interact with the network to control such undesirable behaviors. The results we
present address this issue.
We begin by reviewing the literature, and then develop some techniques for the control of
continuous-time epidemic processes which provide stochastic stability guarantees. These
results are significant, in that they provide advancements in aspects of epidemic control
that have been under investigation for some time. After verifying that the designed controller outperforms a simple heuristic on an example problem, we take note of the fact that
implementing the controller in a practical setting may be computationally expensive, due
to the difficulty of the required optimization. This motivates a search for computationally
tractable control methods.
We thus change focus to considering the control of discrete-time epidemic processes. We
develop two novel controllers. One addresses the issue of mitigating the spread of biological
disease by way of allocating discrete protective resources. The other addresses the issue
of optimizing the performance of a network of devices that are responding to a malware
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attack. In each case, polynomial-time algorithms are constructed to implement the controller. This is notable, as the control actions in each case were taken to be discrete sets with
exponentially many elements. Together, these results demonstrate that there is promise
in controlling recurrent epidemic processes in several contexts, where our ability to do so
tractably is most closely tied to the recognition of a special structure in the task under
consideration. We close the dissertation by providing comments on possible directions for
future research.
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CHAPTER 1 : Introduction and Summary of Contributions
Complex, interconnected systems are a pervasive feature of our modern world. Examples
come both as a consequence of newly developed technologies (e.g. smart devices and social
networks), and as a basic feature of biology (e.g. the spread of disease through plant
and animal populations). There are phenomena which occur on all such systems which
may spread rapidly, often to great ill effect. For example, networks of smart devices can
propagate malware [1–4], networks of social agents can propagate misinformation [5], and
networks of biological agents can propagate disease [6,7]. Ideally, we should like to be able to
interact with these systems so as to place negative phenomena under tight control without
incurring severe cost. Determining how to do so is a central focus of the field of epidemic
control, the topic of this dissertation. We review the main paradigms established by prior
work in Section 1.1. After the review, we detail the main contributions communicated in
the body of the dissertation in Section 1.2

1.1. A Review of Epidemic Control
In this section, we briefly review previous work in the broad area of epidemic control. The
modern study of epidemic processes has been under development since at least the 1920s,
with the first works of note often considered to be those of Kermack and McKendrick [8–10].
In these works, the authors propose a dynamical model for disease spread in which the
“chance,” that a person becomes infected with a disease increases proportionally with the
number of infections currently in the system. Perhaps most well-known among their results
is their observation in [8] that for any given set of disease characteristics, there exists a
critical population density above which a significant epidemic will take place, and below
which no epidemic will occur. As these qualitative features are observed in real-world
diseases, variations on their model and its analysis have come to characterize a wide swath
of the epidemics literature as a whole.
In the century since Kermack and McKendrick’s work, contributions to the study of epide-
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mics have come from scholars in myriad fields: mathematics, mathematical biology, physics,
computer science, and control theory. As such, the body of work is vast. We cannot hope
to give a comprehensive review here. We only strive to adequately survey the field, so as
to communicate a broad understanding of what has been done, for the purpose of framing
the contributions of this dissertation (summarized in Section 1.2), and their fit within the
broader context of the field as a whole.
Qualitatively, all epidemic models share three objects: (i) a collection of compartments
representing a universe of possible statuses, (ii) a collection of agents (alternatively, nodes or
devices) across which the statuses spread, and (iii) a mechanism which causes status spread
(compartmental membership transitions) between agents. The particulars of how each
object is defined determine the differences between epidemic models, with specific definitions
being commonly shared within research communities. We find it to be particularly helpful to
categorize models in accordance with the mechanisms used to define how agents transition
between different statuses. In particular, we make a distinction between models which evolve
in continuous-time, and those which evolve in discrete-time. The literature regarding each
is discussed in the following two subsections.
1.1.1. Analysis and Control of Continuous-time Epidemics
Many of the spreading models studied in physics, mathematical biology, and control theory are descendants of the model Kermack-McKendrick posited for the spread of biological
disease [8]. Originally, this model was posed as a system of ordinary differential equations
constructed so that the “chance of an infection [spreading to a new individual] is proportional to the number of infected [individuals]...” [8, pg. 703], but specific technical details
regarding how the “chance,” was to be determined were left undefined. All uncertainty was
taken to vanish in the limit of small time, resulting in a model specified as a system of
ordinary differential equations.
Models resulting from modifications of Kermack and McKendrick’s differential equations are
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now understood to be mean-field approximations to continuous-time stochastic processes in
which the agents’ statuses transition as a function of random contacts between agents, and
random internal events (see, e.g., [11, 12] for a more detailed accounting on the historical
developments of epidemic models). Specifically, the inter-event times for status transition
events are assumed to be exponentially distributed, and so specify a continuous-time Markov
chain [12] (or equivalently, a system of Poisson jump stochastic differential equations).
As all statuses of all agents need to be known in order to specify the transition rate of the
process at any given time, an exact representation of a continuous-time epidemic process
with n agents and m compartments requires the study of a Markov chain with O(mn ) states. As such a description has a state space which grows exponentially in the number of
agents, it is too complex for direct study. As such, researchers often study a mean-field
type approximation to the process, wherein expectations of products of random variables
are replaced with products of expectations (see, e.g., [13] and references therein). Performing this approximation results in a system of O(nm) nonlinear ordinary differential
equations, the mean-field approximation of the stochastic system. These are variations of
the differential equations posited by Kermack and McKendrick referenced earlier. While
mean-field approximations are beneficial in that their state-space representation is considerably less complex than that of the Markov chain representation, it is not known in general
how well the behavior of a particular Markov chain model and its attendant mean-field
approximation correspond. This is a source of interest in the modern epidemic research
community [14].
Insofar as control is concerned, the literature can be decomposed into two broad approaches.
In one approach, authors apply techniques from optimal control (usually, the Pontryagin
maximum principle) in order to design an optimal control law for the mean-field model
(typically, a function of time which varies one of the rates defining the process’s evolution). Many variations on this approach have been performed, with the intent of pursuing
applications in several domains, ranging from control of a biological disease [15–30] to opti-
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mal information dissemination [31–41]. This technique works well when the problem under
study is sufficiently well structured so as to admit an optimal control policy in a class of
well-structured control policies that can be searched exhaustively. It is not generally the
case that this procedure can be enacted efficiently in the absence of special structure, e.g.
homogeneity.
In the second approach, the epidemic is controlled by designing its parameters in such a
way to optimize a cost function, subject to constraints which guarantee some desirable
notion of stability on the epidemic’s mean-field model [42–50]. Such an approach is most
appropriate in a context where stability has a clear, meaningful interpretation and the
system’s parameters can be set as part of the network’s design. This could be true in the
design of a communication network. Here, the rate at which any particular pair of nodes
communicates messages can be set as part the system’s design. Stability conditions can be
imposed to ensure that improper behavior ceases quickly.
However, it is not clear that the mean-field approximation will produce good predictions
on heterogeneous graphs [51–53]. Indeed, results concerning the accuracy of mean-field
approximations are constrained to homogeneous networks, in the limit of large populations
(see, e.g. [27, 54, 55]). As such, it is interesting to consider what can be done to control the
processes in such a way so as to establish guarantees on the stochastic models themselves.
There is little previously established in the literature on this topic. We know of only
one approach which predates the work presented later in the dissertation. Specifically,
the works [56] and [57] study the priority-order allocation of healing resources for controlling a continuous-time epidemic process with two compartments, the Susceptible-InfectedSusceptible (SIS) processes. In this approach, a limited amount of healing resource (the
application of which is modeled as varying the rate at which a node transitions from infections to susceptible over a continuous range) is applied to the network for purposes of
control, where high-priority infected nodes are treated before others. It was shown in [56]
that if the a sufficient amount of healing resources are available, then the epidemic can be
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driven to extinction in linear time using the optimal priority order strategy. However, computing the optimal priority ordering for a general network is N P-hard (and N P-hard to
approximate), which limits this approach’s potential. This is mitigated by a result in [57],
which demonstrates that any priority order strategy can drive the epidemic to extinction
quickly if sufficient healing resources are made available. While interesting in principle,
it is difficult to see how to extend this idea to more involved spreading process models.
In particular, when there is more than one “undesirable,” compartment (in this example,
infectious nodes), one cannot expect to be able to define an ordering over the space of compartmental memberships to be used in determining resource allocations. Moreover, most
means of intervening with an epidemic seem to be of a discrete nature: providing vaccinations, enforcing quarantines, resetting broken devices, etc. As such, these methods need to
be improved upon in order to be useful.
Making such advancements is not trivial. Indeed, a significant portion of this dissertation
(Chapters 3-4) focuses on this task. As will be seen through the course of these developments, developing controllers for continuous-time epidemic processes is computationally
intensive. As such, it is worth considering if it is possible to construct computationally
efficient controllers for models which capture the same phenomena which cause continuoustime epidemic processes to be desirable: the ability to model the spread of status through
a network of agents by way of random interactions. We will see that it is indeed possible to
construct controllers efficiently for specific problems regarding the control of discrete-time
epidemic processes, reviewed next.
1.1.2. Analysis and Control of Discrete-time Epidemics
Whereas continuous-time epidemic processes incorporate uncertainty by defining their dynamics as functions of independent Poisson processes (see Chapter 2), discrete-time epidemic
processes incorporate uncertainty by defining their dynamics as functions of independent
Bernoulli processes (see Chapter 5). Researchers in computer science study discrete-time
epidemic processes, though often under the alternate name spreading processes. Most com-
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monly, they study processes in which particular statuses do not recur. That is, once an
agent has exhibited a particular status (which may last for several consecutive time slots),
it never exhibits that status again. This feature guarantees that such epidemics cease to
evolve quickly, and enables them to be studied efficiently via simulation. Additionally, it
has been shown in several contexts that computing good control actions is computationally
possible for discrete-time epidemics.
For example, it was shown in [58, 59] that the optimal seeding problem can be written as
a constrained submodular maximization, when considering linear threshold or independent
cascade spreading models. Principally, this result is due to cardinality of the set of nodes
eventually affected by the process being a coverage function on every path of the process.
Similar properties have been demonstrated for many other control problems concerning
non-recurrent discrete-time epidemic processes. Variously, these works have studied seed
selection [60–68], edge deletion [69–74], and node removal [75–79] as means for controlling
the process’ evolution. While these results suggest that discrete-time epidemics may be
interesting objects of study, there is a relative lack of work studying the control of recurrent
discrete-time epidemic processes. That is, processes in which a particular status can be
repeated without limit by any node. As will be discussed, such processes capture qualitative
features of biological and technological epidemics, and so are important (see Chapters 4, 6
and 7).
Much of the study of discrete-time epidemic processes has been constrained to non-recurrent
epidemics, i.e. those in which compartmental memberships cannot be repeated by agents.
The first discussion of recurrent discrete-time epidemics appears to have arisen only recently
[80–91]. In [80], a deterministic approximation to a discrete-time Susceptible-InfectedSusceptible epidemic was proposed and analyzed. A method of resource allocation designed
to stabilize the system proposed in [80] at optimal cost was designed in [81]. In [82, 83], the
stability of a deterministic, mean-field type approximation to a discrete-time SusceptibleInfected-Susceptible (SIS) model was studied. In [84], a deterministic approximation to a
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discrete-time SIS process in which healthy nodes remove themselves with some designed
probability was proposed, and was shown to globally asymptotically stabilize the origin, so
long as the probability of self-removal was sufficiently high. An ordering relation between the
evolution of the standard deterministic approximation to the discrete-time SIS epidemic
(and some variations thereof) was shown in [87–90], which allows one to use stability of
the deterministic system to imply a notion of stability on the stochastic system. In [85],
stability properties of a deterministic approximation to a competitive discrete-time epidemic
were demonstrated. In [91], a game in which agents are infected with by a discrete-time
SIS epidemic was analyzed by deterministic approximation to determine the effectiveness
of individual behavior changes in mitigating disease propagation. It was found that the
actions taken by infectious individuals had more influence on the long-term behavior of the
process than those of healthy individuals.
As is the case with continuous-time epidemics, there is very little prior work on the stochastic control of discrete-time epidemics recurrent epidemics. It appears that work done
in preparation for this thesis was the first to study a principled method of feedback control
for such processes [92]. We present further work on this topic in Chapters 6 and 7.

1.2. Summary of Contributions, and Document Structure
Broadly speaking, the focus of this dissertation is on the control of recurrent epidemic processes. This focus is due to the relative lack of study in the area. As noted in Section 1.1.1,
the majority of work considering the control of continuous-time epidemics has focused on
analyzing optimal control laws for mean-field approximations to epidemics, or on designing
spreading networks to guarantee some notion of mean-field, open-loop stability. What few
works exist that give formal guarantees on the epidemic’s evolution are limited to the SIS
process. As noted in Section 1.1.2, there are scarcely any works which consider the control
of discrete-time ground truth models of epidemics.
This topic is important, as recurrent epidemics capture qualitative features of several phe-
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nomena that occur in the real world, and ought to be controlled. For example, several
variants of biological disease (e.g. chlamydia and gonorrhea) do not confer immunity to
people who recover from an infection (see, e.g., [93]). For another example, some variations
of malware (e.g. Mirai and its descendants) can reinfect devices that have had malicious
code removed [2–4]. In both settings, it would be desirable to understand which control
actions should be applied to the system at what times in order to best mitigate the effect of
infection on the collection of agents. This dissertation contains results that provide advances in this understanding, both for continuous-time epidemics (formally defined in Chapter
2), and for discrete-time epidemics (formally defined in Chapter 5).
Our study on control of continuous-time epidemics provides two notable contributions:
1. A moment closure method for general continuous-time epidemics which provides provable approximation guarantees (Chapter 3),
2. A predictive control scheme which when applied, provably drives an epidemic into a
desired set of states quickly (Chapter 4).
The robust moment closure developed in Chapter 3 is notable in that it addresses a longstanding open question in the study of epidemic processes: providing a deterministic approximation to the evolution of stochastic continuous-time epidemic models (see [14, Section
9]). To understand why this is important, one must note that the widely used mean-field
approximation provides no accuracy guarantee in general, and derivative matching techniques (e.g. [94–97]) provide only guarantees which hold locally and statically; they do not
account for the integration of error across time. Moreover, the construction presented in
Chapter 3 uses optimal bounds on the second-order moments, and exploits several features
of the process in order to guarantee that all generated predictions remain nontrivial for all
times. As such, we believe the technique to be of broad interest to the community scholars
engaged in the study of epidemic processes.
The material presented in Chapter 4 is notable in that it demonstrates that the satisfaction
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of a simple stability constraint whenever an action is applied suffices to provide strong stability guarantees on the closed-loop process. Since the robust moment closure developed in
Chapter 3 can be used to certify the satisfaction of this constraint, these results together
affirm that controllers for continuous-time epidemics with provable convergence properties
can be designed. As guaranteeing stability of epidemics is a frequent focus in the literature (see, e.g., [8, 12, 43, 44, 46, 50, 57, 81, 98–104]), this result should be of interest to the
community. However, it is found that the implementation of the controllers designed is
computationally expensive. In particular, the optimization problem to be solved at each
time is not well structured, and so must be addressed by heuristic global search methods.
As such, it seems better in many cases to search for alternative means of modeling the
phenomena at work, so as to make the design of a useful controller less complex. This is
the purpose of our change in focus, to discrete-time epidemics.
Our study on the control of discrete-time epidemics provides two notable contributions:
1. A receding horizon controller which allocates discrete protective resources so as to
minimize the expected cost incurred by an outbreak of a recurrent biological epidemic
on an arbitrary spreading graph (Chapter 6),
2. A method for computing optimal device reset strategies for maximizing the performance of a networked system comprised of a small number of groups of statistically
identical objects, which is under attack from a malware program (Chapter 7).
The material presented in Chapter 6 is notable, as it is seems to be the first which demonstrates that optimal control actions can be computed to mitigate biological epidemics with
reinfection, when the available control actions are discrete. This is important, as the result
is established for an objective function which is of the same qualitative form as prior work,
and so admits a similar interpretation. It is believed that this formulation can be used to
advance efforts in the control of biological epidemics.
The material presented in Chapter 7 is notable, as it is believed to be the first work which
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considers the optimal control of malware epidemics in which device resets are used as a
control action. This is important, as many variations of malware are removed when devices
are reset (e.g., variants of Mirai [2–4]). Moreover, the core technical results which enable
the efficient computation of such control laws are developed independently of the considered
context. They rely primarily on a slight assumption made as to the structure of the network
and objective function under consideration. As such, we believe that similar techniques can
be used broadly, and should be of interest to the community of epidemic researchers.
In sum, the methods presented in the following chapters constitute a significant advance in
the body of knowledge concerning the control of recurrent epidemic processes. Nevertheless,
there is much work left to be done before epidemic control is capable of having impact on
real-world systems. As such, comments regarding directions for future work are presented
in Chapter 8, which formally close the text.
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CHAPTER 2 : Continuous-time Epidemics: Concepts and Notation
In this chapter, we develop the notation and concepts necessary to discuss continuous-time
epidemics formally. These are used to develop novel results in Chapters 3 and 4. The model
itself is not fundamentally new, as the class of stochastic processes described is the same
as those described by the General Epidemic Modeling Framework (GEMF) [13]. However,
our construction here differers somewhat from the standard treatment, as we develop the
processes through stochastic calculus, as opposed to Markov chain theory.
We consider the dynamics of a general compartmental epidemic spreading model. In this
model, each agent in a population is represented in a directed n-node spreading graph G =
(V, E) by a particular node i ∈ V. Relations between agents are encoded by edges (i, j) ∈ E.
We represent the current status of a node (e.g. state of infection, belief, or behavior) by
membership in one of a set of m compartments. Each compartment is associated to one
and only one label ` in the set of compartmental labels L.
We denote by X(t) a stochastic vector containing the compartmental memberships of each
node at time t. To make the notation as intuitive as possible, we index X(t) in two dimensions: one which indicates the compartment which is being described, and the other the
numerical label of the node. As such, we denote by Xi` (t) an indicator random variable, taking the value 1 if node i is in compartment `, and 0 otherwise. We see that for an epidemic
P
process to be well defined, we must have that for all times t, it holds that `∈L Xi` (t) = 1
for all i. That is, each node always belongs to precisely one compartment. We denote by
X the set of states of the process, which is taken to be the subset of {0, 1}n×L such that
P
the compartmental membership constraint `∈L Xi` = 1 holds for all i. It is straightforward to verify that X has mn elements, as each possible combination of compartmental
memberships is a possible state of the process.
Figure 1 provides an illustration of an epidemic process with five compartments. Note that
it is often the case in the literature that compartments are assigned alphabetical symbols
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Figure 1: A compartmental diagram of a general continuous-time epidemic process, in
which each agent belongs to one of five compartments. The transition process for node 4
is explicitly illustrated, in which edges denote that a particular transition can occur with
positive probability (i.e. with probability greater than zero).
bearing a mnemonic relation to the description of a particular status: S for “susceptible,” I
for “infected,” R for “removed,” and so forth (see, e.g., [12, 13, 105] and references therein).
Our use of abstract labels `k here is due to the generality of our considerations: there is no
assumed meaning to any compartment. This allows us to develop results in Chapters 3 and
4 which are independent of a particular context.
Agents transitions between compartmental memberships due to random events, which may
be either internal (e.g. healing from an infection) or external (e.g. coming into contact
with an infectious person). These events are assumed to be mutually independent, and
occur at intervals with lengths given as exponentially distributed random variables (i.e. the
transition processes are independent Poisson processes). As such, general continuous-time
epidemic processes can be posed as a system of Itô integrals taken with respect to measures
of independent Poisson processes as

dXi` =

X

0

0

0

Xi` dP`i →` − Xi` dP`→`
+
i

`0 ∈L

XX

0

0

0

0

Xi` Xj` dQ`ij→` − Xi` Xj` dQ`→`
,
ij

(2.1)

j∈V `0 ∈L
0

0

where the symbols dP`i →` and dQ`ij→` denote the probability measures associated to endogenous (i.e. due to causes internal to the agent) and exogenous (i.e. due to causes external
to the agent) transitions, respectively. Note that whenever a particular transition ` → `0 is
not possible, we take the corresponding measure to instead be the constant zero, as doing
so greatly simplifies notation. Note also that the solutions of (2.1) are stochastic processes
{X(t)}, such that each component {Xi` (t)} takes the value 1 when node i is in compartment
12

`, and the value 0 otherwise. As such, the solutions {X(t)} are constant almost everywhere
(i.e. the state changes only on a set of measure zero), and so one should take care to interpret the derivative symbols dXi` only as a shorthand for a stochastic integral, as is typical
in the study of stochastic differential equations [106]. This only effects us in that it requires
a careful treatment to derive the statistics of (2.1) we wish to control.
Since each process {Xi` (t)} takes value 1 to indicate that node i is in compartment ` at
time t, their expectation gives the marginal compartmental membership probabilities. As
we wish to control the compartmental memberships of the nodes, it then follows that we
should study the expectations of (2.1). Deriving the appropriate differential equations
requires a brief technical argument, which we now give.
Since the integrands of (2.1) are always finite, the process is square integrable (i.e. has finite
second moment). As such, a consequence of Itô’s lemma is that the expectation operator
and the Itô integral commute (see, e.g., [106, Theorem 3.20]). Thus, the expectation of the
probability measures of the Poisson processes become the rates of the process. Carrying
this computation through, we may take the expectation of both sides of (2.1) to arrive at
the integral equations
E[Xi` (t)]

Z
=

t

0

0

0

E[Xi` (h)]λ`i →` − E[Xi` (h)]λ`→`
+
i

0

X

0

0

0

(2.2)

0

E[Xi` Xj` (h)]µ`ij→` − E[Xi` Xj` (h)]µ`→`
dh.
ij

(j,`0 )∈V×L

Note that only ordinary Riemann integrals remain in (2.2), so we may apply the fundamental
theorem of calculus (see, e.g., [107, Theorem 6.20]) to arrive at the system of ordinary,
nonlinear differential equations:
X
XX
dE[Xi` ]
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
=
E[Xi` ]λ`i →` − E[Xi` ]λ`→`
+
E[Xi` Xj` ]µ`ij→` − E[Xi` Xj` ]µ`→`
, (2.3)
i
ij
dt
0
0
` ∈L

j∈V ` ∈L

0

0

where the terms λ`i →` are the transition rates associated to the measures dP`i →` , and the

13

0

0

terms µ`ij→` are the transition rates associated to the measures dQ`ij→` .
It is important to note that the system of ordinary differential equations (2.3) is not closed.
We have no expressions detailing the evolution of the second-order moments, which are
required to evaluate the right-hand side of (2.3). However, there is no known method
for closing the system (2.3) tractably without introducing the possibility of incorporating
significant error. This is the primary feature of continuous-time epidemic processes which
make their study difficult. Indeed, explicit representation of the higher-order moments can
be done by constructing a Markov chain with mn states. This is done in [13]. As for any
fixed number of compartments m, this representation grows exponentially with the size of
the network (i.e. n), such representations cannot be considered in general.
This is why continuous-time epidemics are usually studied via approximation. However, the
approximations typically introduce errors which interact with the system in complicated and
poorly understood ways [12]. In particular, most authors currently use mean-field type mo0

ment closures in the style of [13,105], in which the second-order moments E[Xi` (t)Xj` (t)] are
0

0

approximated as E[Xi` (t)Xj` (t)] ≈ E[Xi` (t)]E[Xj` (t)]. There are only accuracy guarantees
for this technique in very special cases. For example, if a process is homogeneous (i.e. if
all nodes i have exactly the same parameters, and the spreading graph is complete), then
the underlying stochastic differential equations (2.1) can be shown to be density dependent,
which is a sufficient condition for mean-field approximations to match the behavior of the
expectation of the stochastic process in the limit of an infinite population [54]. Developing
deterministic approximations of continuous-time epidemic models was recently identified as
a significant open question [14, Section 9], as it is not clear when mean-field approximations
can approximate the behavior of stochastic epidemics on nontrivial networks well.
The model (2.1) encapsulates the majority of continuous-time epidemic models studied in
the literature. One can see that the often-studied Susceptible-Infected-Removed (SIR) and
Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) epidemics are special cases of (2.1), where SIR uses
three compartments (Susceptible, Infected, and Removed), and SIS uses two (Susceptible
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and Infected). Broadly speaking, any epidemic belonging to the General Epidemic Modeling
Framework (GEMF) [13] is treated by (2.1). Moreover, extensions which allow for more
than one type of compartmental membership to force a transition into a compartment
(as is the case in SEIV epidemics [50, 108]) are straightforward. As such, results which
concern (2.1) will be of broad use, and will necessarily address the fundamental features of
continuous-time epidemic processes, as opposed to features of special cases.
The next few chapters develop results which consider the control of continuous-time epidemic processes in the form of (2.1). Chapter 3 provides a moment closure method that
allows the expectations of (2.1) to be approximated nontrivially by the solutions of a system
of 2mn ordinary differential equations. Such approximations can be simulated much more
efficiently than stochastic simulation of the process (2.1), and provide an analytical means
of studying the expectations (2.3). As such, they allow us to consider the task of controlling
the evolution of (2.1), which is considered in Chapter 4. In particular, a predictive controller which provides strong convergence guarantees is designed, and its application to the
mitigation of an SEIV epidemic is studied in detail, where the control actions developed
provide a significant improvement over a heuristic control policy.
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CHAPTER 3 : A Robust Moment Closure for General Continuous-time Epidemics
In this chapter and the next, we study the analysis and control of continuous-time epidemic
processes of the form (2.1). As noted in Chapter 1, these models have been the most
predominantly studied mathematical models for epidemics in several communities. Among
them are mathematical biology, physics, and control theory. As such, understanding when
such models can be well controlled is of intellectual interest.
In the present chapter, we construct a deterministic approximation to the expectation dynamics (2.3) of the general continuous-time epidemic model (2.1). The development of such a
method was mentioned as a significant open problem in a recent review of deterministic epidemic models [14, Section 9]). Interest in such a technique is due to the fact that commonly
used approximation methods come with no known accuracy guarantees (see, e.g., [12, 13]
and references therein). As such, analytical guarantees pertaining to the evolution of the
underlying stochastic process are not generally possible to attain. The moment closure we
present in this section allows for analytical guarantees to be attained for any process of the
form (2.1). In particular, we see in Chapter 4 that the predictions resulting from this moment closure can be used to verify the satisfaction of a stability constraint that guarantees
the epidemic to be driven to a desirable set of states quickly.
Note that these results are adapted from those that have been made publicly available
[109,110], where [109] is scheduled to appear at the 2018 IEEE Conference on Decision and
Control, and [110] is under review for publication in a journal. The treatment here is for the
same class of processes as considered in [109], at a level of detail more closely resembling that
which was given in [110], in which only the Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Vigilant (SEIV )
process was treated in detail.
Organization

Our work develops in three phases. First, we construct a naı̈ve moment

closure which provides correct approximations to (2.3) in a manner which is simple (Section
3.1). Then, we refine the naı̈ve approximations to provide a system which produces a
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higher-quality approximation (Section 3.2). Importantly, the improved approximation has
the property that the attained predictions are always valid probabilities (i.e., in [0, 1]).
Finally, we demonstrate how to optimize the quality of expected compartmental membership
predictions which use the refined approximations designed (Section 3.3). We then close
the chapter by numerically investigating the quality of the results by simulation (Section
3.4). It is important to note that there are some cases found in which the mean-field
approximation’s predictions differ significantly from the realized sample expectations of the
stochastic simulation, but the predictions attained from the method developed properly
•

constrain the evolution of the sample expectations.

3.1. A Naı̈ve Robust Moment Closure
We begin our formal developments by constructing a naı̈ve robust robust moment closure
for the general continuous-time epidemic (2.1). Note that this moment closure will have
significant faults. In particular, predictions made by this method are not guaranteed to be
valid probabilities, (i.e. remain in [0, 1]). Our purpose in developing this method explicitly
here is in providing insight to later developments. Some features introduced to the approximation in Section 3.2 may seem unnecessarily complicated if we were to proceed directly
to the final result without presenting the simpler system we develop here.
As they play a significant role in our analysis, let us now define the Fréchet inequalities.
Definition 1 (Fréchet Inequalities [111]) Define the operators Flwr (y, z) , max{0, y +
z − 1}, and Fupr (y, z) , min{y, z}. Let Pr be a probability measure on some event space
Ω, and let A and B be events defined on Ω. Then, it holds that

Flwr (Pr(A), Pr(B)) ≤ Pr(A, B) ≤ Fupr (Pr(A), Pr(B)),

(3.1)

where the notation Pr(A, B) denotes the joint probability, i.e. the probability that the event
{A ∩ B} occurs.
The Fréchet inequalities provide a way of bounding the value of the second-moment terms
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0

E[Xi` Xj` ] in terms of the first-order terms E[Xi` ]. In particular, they are the tightest inequalities which estimate joint probabilities solely on the basis of marginal probabilities [111],
and so are optimal. Using these bounds carefully allows us to define a dynamics which approximate the solutions of (2.3) by solving a system of 2mn ordinary differential equations.
One set of mn equations is used to track upper-bounds on the solutions {E[Xi` (t)]}; the
remaining mn equations track lower-bounds. Their form, and proof of their validity, follow.
Theorem 1 (Fréchet Moment Closure for Continuous-time Epidemics) Let x(0) =
˜
X(0) = x̃(0), and consider the solutions of the system of ordinary differential equations
x̃˙ `i =

X

x̃`i λ`i →` − x̃`i λi`→` +

0

0

0

XX

0
0
x`i λ`i →`

0
x`i λi`→`

XX

`0 ∈L

x˙ `i

˜

=

X
`0 ∈L

¯

−

¯

+

0

0

0

0

Fupr (x̃`i , x̃`j )µ`ij→` − Flwr (x̃`i , x`j )µ`→`
,
ij
˜
j∈V `0 ∈L
0
0
Flwr (x`i , x`j )µ`ij→`

˜

j∈V `0 ∈L

˜

−

(3.2)

0
0
Fupr (x`i , x̃`j )µ`→`
.
ij

˜

Then, for every compartment ` ∈ L and each node i ∈ V, the inclusion E[Xi` (t)|X(0)] ∈
 `

xi (t|0), x̃`i (t|0) , holds for all t ≥ 0, where x`i (t|0) and x̃`i (t|0) are used to denote the under˜
˜
`
and over-approximation of E[Xi (t)|X(0)] with respect to the dynamics (3.2).
Proof : We state and prove an extension to the comparison lemma (see, e.g., [112, Lemma
3.4]) in Section 3.5.1, which demonstrates a condition under which component-wise orderings are preserved under integration of the dynamics. This is the central technical feature
of the proof. Having established an appropriate version of the comparison lemma, all that
remains to prove the result is to demonstrate that the dynamics (2.3) satisfy the hypothesis of Lemma 1, where the approximation dynamics (3.2) are compared against the exact
dynamics (2.3). We show this in Section 3.5.2, completing the proof.



While the approximation dynamics given by (3.2) are technically correct and can be used
to estimate the process statistics, they are not without fault. In particular, we may note
that they include no mechanism for ensuring that the approximations remain bounded
in the unit interval. This means that there is no way of ruling out the possibility that
the solutions of the approximating dynamics (3.2) become uninformative (i.e. have states
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Figure 2: A demonstration that the crude Fréchet approximation system given by (3.2) does
not generate approximations such that the estimates of compartmental membership probabilities remain bounded in the unit interval, whereas the refined approximation dynamics
(3.6) do. This underscores the fact that when designing a moment closure approximation,
care must be taken to ensure that the solutions of the resulting approximation system
behave reasonably.
which leave [0, 1]) at some time. Indeed, as demonstrated in Figure 2, it is the case the
approximations generated from this system give upper-bounds which exceed one eventually,
and hence become trivial. This occurs because the error which enters the approximating
system is integrated through time into the evolution of the approximations of the marginal
probabilities. Addressing this issue so as to guarantee that the approximations always
remain nontrivial requires a deeper analysis, which comes in the following subsection.

3.2. A Refined Robust Moment Closure
We begin this section by developing a proposition which equips us with a formal test for
determining when one set of approximation dynamics is better than another, in terms of
set inclusion. The result is stated as follows:
Proposition 1 (Constructing Tighter Approximations) Consider the functions f
˜
and f˜ defining the dynamics (3.2), and let {x, x̃} be the solutions of (3.2). Suppose f and
˜
¯
f¯ are Lipschitz continuous functions on R(V×L)×2 which satisfy
[fi` (x, x̄), f¯i` (x, x̄)] ⊆ [fi` (x, x̃), f˜i` (x, x̃)]
¯
˜
¯ ¯
˜ ˜

(3.3)

on X̄i` ∪ Xi` for all (i, `) ∈ V × L, where X̄i` is the subset of points (x, x̄, x, x̃) of R(V×L)×4
¯
¯
˜
0
0
0
0
such that x̄`i = x̃`i , and [x`j , x̄`j ] ⊆ [x`j , x̃`j ] holds for all (j, `0 ) ∈ V × L, and Xi` is defined
¯
¯
˜
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similarly. Then, the system
x̄˙ = f¯(x, x̄),
¯

(3.4)

x˙ = f (x, x̄),
¯ ¯ ¯
with initial conditions x(0) = x(0), x̄(0) = x̃(0) has solutions {x, x̄} which satisfy [x`i (t), x̄`i (t)] ⊆
¯
¯
¯
˜
[x`i (t), x̃`i (t)] for all (i, `) ∈ V × L and any time t ≥ 0.
˜
Proof : See Appendix 3.5.3.



Proposition 1 gives a means for testing whether or not the crude approximation given by
(3.2) is improved upon by a new candidate approximation, and is the main result we use in
developing a refinement of (3.2).
The most significant modification over (3.2) required to ensure all estimates remain bounded
to the unit interval for all time is in ensuring the dynamics of each approximating upperbound are non-increasing when the approximating upper-bound is equal to one, and the
dynamics of the approximating lower-bound are non-decreasing when it is equal to zero.
To accomplish such an approximation, we introduce complement bounds to the dynamics,
which we define as follows.
Definition 2 (Complement Bounding Operator) Let ` ∈ L be a compartmental label
of the process (2.1). We define the complement upper-bounding operator associated to ` as

Bx̄` y , min{1 − x̄`i , y}.
i

(3.5)

In essence, we see that improvements over (3.2) can be made if we replace all instances
of variables which can cause unbounded growth with appropriate complement bounds. By
doing so systematically, we arrive at a better approximating system, which we give here in
Theorem 2.
Theorem 2 (Refined Fréchet Moment Closure) Let x(0) = X(0) = x̄(0), and consider
¯
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the solutions of the system of nonlinear ordinary differential equations
x̄˙ `i =

X

0

X
`0 ∈L

0

i

`0 ∈L

x˙ ` =
¯i

0

Bx̄` (x̄`i )λ`i →` − x̄`i λi`→` +
0

XX
j∈V `0 ∈L

0

0

x` λ` →` − x`i λ`→`
+
¯i i
¯ i

XX
j∈V `0 ∈L

0

0

0

0

,
Fupr (Bx̄` (x̄`i ), x̄`j )µ`ij→` − Flwr (x̄`i , x`j )µ`→`
ij
i
¯
0

0

0

0

Flwr (x`i , x`j )µ`ij→` − Fupr (x`i , x̄`j )µ`→`
.
ij
¯ ¯
¯
(3.6)

Then, for every compartment ` ∈ L and each node i ∈ V,
i
h
E[Xi` (t)|X(0)] ∈ x`i (t|0), x̄`i (t|0) ⊆ [0, 1],
¯

(3.7)

h
i h
i
x`i (t|0), x̄`i (t|0) ⊆ x`i (t|0), x̃`i (t|0) ,
¯
˜

(3.8)

and

hold for all t ≥ 0, where x`i (t|0) and x̄`i (t|0) are used to denote the under- and over¯
`
approximation of E[Xi (t)|X(0)] with respect to the dynamics (3.6), and x`i (t|0) and x̃`i (t|0)
˜
are used to denote the under- and over-approximation of E[Xi` (t)|X(0)] with respect to the
dynamics (3.2).
Proof : See Section 3.5.4.



We can think of the process that we have used to arrive at (3.6) from (2.3) as one of successively pruning the set of trajectories permitted by the approximating systems. In the step
where we moved from (2.3) to (3.2), we used the Fréchet inequalities to constrain the set
of trajectories our system may admit as solutions to a superset of the set of probability
measures the Fréchet approximations permit. In moving from (3.2) to (3.6), we further
restrict the set of solutions to those which satisfy simple complementarity bounds. In so
doing, each step improved the accuracy with which the dynamics are approximated. Notably, the solutions of (3.6) always provide valid, nontrivial predictions for the compartmental
membership probabilities E[Xi` ]. However, we may generally be concerned with optimizing
predictions of a more coarse statistic of the process, such as the expected number of nodes
in each compartment at each time. We see how to best to accomplish this by using (3.6) in
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the following section.

3.3. Optimizing Set Membership Probability Predictions
It seems that it may often be the case that a collective statistic describing a collective
property of the network would be useful in designing controllers. For example, one may
be interested in predicting the number of infectious agents are in a system after a certain
amount of time has passed, after a certain control action is applied. This is done in Chapter
4 to impose a stability constraint on the designed controller. Since the results of Sections
3.1 and 3.2 apply to predicting the evolution of individual nodes, one may wonder if improvements can be made when tasked with predicting the evolution of a coarser statistic.
Our next result demonstrates that this is the case. In particular, we demonstrate how to
compute optimal predictions of set membership expectations, given solutions to (3.6).
Theorem 3 (Optimal Approximation of Set Membership Expectations)

Let

x(0) = X(0) = x̄(0), and consider the solutions (x, x̄) of (3.6) evaluated at time t. De¯
¯
fine M(X) as the number of nodes belonging to compartments M ⊆ L in state X. It holds
that
E[M(X(t))|X(0)] ≤

X

min

i∈V



X


X

i∈V

x̄`i (t), 1 −

`∈M

and that
E[M(X(t))|X(0)] ≥


X

max



`∈M

X
`∈L\M

x` (t), 1 −
¯i

X
`∈L\M



x`i (t) ,

¯

x̄`i (t)




.

(3.9)

(3.10)



Moreover, the bounds are the tightest which can be derived from the inclusions generated
by integrating the approximation dynamics (3.6).
Proof : See Section 3.5.5.



The proof of Theorem 3 follows from forming variational characterizations of the optimal
upper- and lower- bounds which can be derived on E[M(X(t))|X(0)], given solutions of
(3.6). Because the optimization problems formulated are highly structured linear programs,
they admit analytical solutions. In particular, the solutions of these optimization problems
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give the inequalities (3.9) and (3.10). We will see in Section 3.4 that this optimization
substantially improves the quality of the predictions made in some situations.
We use Theorem 3 in Chapter 4 to aid in evaluating a stability constraint in the formulated
predictive controller, where the expectation we are interested in approximating is the count
of nodes exhibiting undesirable behavior. It is also easy to envision cases in which Theorem
3 is used to approximate statistics on the set of nodes exhibiting a desirable behavior,
which may be kept above a certain level. Additionally, it is straightforward to show that
the analysis used to prove Theorem 3 can generalize readily to any case in which we are
interested in making predictions of a linear statistic of X(t). However, we will not generally
have an analytical solution to the relevant linear programs, and so will have to settle for
computing numerical solutions.

3.4. Numerical Simulations
In this section, we demonstrate the utility of our results by performing numerical simulations on two continuous-time epidemic processes. Because previous experience has shown
that mean-field approximations are not necessarily good proxies for the expectation of the
process for competitive epidemics [49], we focus our attention on two particular competitive
epidemic models. The first model (SI1 SI2 S, Section 3.4.1) has been extensively studied in
prior literature [49, 113–115]; the second (Direct Competition, Section 3.4.2) is a variation
on SI1 SI2 S designed to accentuate the weaknesses of mean-field approximation, and the
strength of our robust moment closure. In particular, it only has exogenous transitions,
which are the source of error in mean-field approximation.
3.4.1. SI1 SI2 S
In principle, the SI1 SI2 S process serves as a mathematical model for product or belief
adaptation for the case in which two products compete for market share. Each node in the
network belongs to one of three compartments: susceptible (S), infected with contagion one
(I1 ), or infected with contagion two (I2 ). Susceptible nodes are interpreted as disinterested
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by both products. Nodes infected with contagion one are supporters of product one. Nodes
infected with contagion two are supporters of product two.
Transitions from the susceptible compartment to a state of infection occurs as a function
of an exogenous process. Transitions from either infected compartment to the susceptible
compartment occur as a function of an endogenous process. By specializing the general
model (2.1) to this setting, one can verify that the corresponding stochastic differential
equations for this process are given by
dXiS = XiI1 dPIi 1 →S + XiI2 dPIi 2 →S −

X

1
2
XiS XjI1 dQS→I
− XiS XjI2 dQS→I
;
ij
ij

(3.11a)

j∈V

dXiI1 =

X

dXiI2 =

X

1
XiS XjI1 dQS→I
− XiI1 dPIi 1 →S ;
ij

(3.11b)

1
XiS XjI2 dQS→I
− XiI2 dPIi 2 →S .
ij

(3.11c)

j∈V

j∈V

By defining notations for mean-field approximation states φ`i for all compartments ` ∈
{S, I1 , I2 }, taking expectations, and replacing expectations of products with products of
mean-field variables, we arrive at the mean-field approximation
φ̇Si = φIi 1 λIi 1 →S + φIi 2 λIi 2 →S −

X

1
2
φSi φIj1 µS→I
− φSi φIj2 µS→I
;
ij
ij

(3.12a)

j∈V

φ̇Ii 1 =

X

1
φSi φIj1 µS→I
− φIi 1 λIi 1 →S ;
ij

(3.12b)

1
φSi φIj2 µS→I
− φIi 2 λIi 2 →S .
ij

(3.12c)

j∈V

φ̇Ii 2 =

X
j∈V

Recognizing that φ̇Si + φ̇Ii 1 + φ̇Ii 2 = 0 and that if we initialize the mean-field approximation to
an observed state of the process, we have φSi +φIi 1 +φIi 2 = 1, we may remove the variables φSi
by substituting the expression 1−φIi 1 −φIi 2 and obtain the reduced mean-field approximation
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φ̇Ii 1 =

X

1
(1 − φIi 1 − φIi 2 )φIj1 µS→I
− φIi 1 λIi 1 →S ,
ij

(3.13a)

1
(1 − φIi 1 − φIi 2 )φIj2 µS→I
− φIi 2 λIi 2 →S ,
ij

(3.13b)

j∈V

φ̇Ii 2 =

X
j∈V

which has been the object of study in prior works on SI1 SI2 S (see [49,113–115] and references therein). As first noted in [49], the mean-field approximation is neither an upper-bound
or a lower-bound of the expected probabilities of infection. We see this here in Figure
3, where contagion one spread on a 50 node Erdös-Rényi graph with connection probability 0.5 with S → I1 transition rate 7 and I1 → S transition rates chosen uniformly at
random from the interval [0, 200], contagion two spread on a 50 node Erdös-Rényi graph
with connection probability 0.5 with S → I2 transition rate 2 and I1 → S transition rates
chosen uniformly at random from the interval [0, 50], where the two spreading graphs were
generated independently.
For this particular simulation, the mean-field approximation overestimates the probability
of being infected by contagion one, and underestimates the probability of being infected
by contagion two. We also see that the the predictions generated by the robust moment
closure are nontrivial. Indeed, it restricts the expectation of the number of infected nodes for
contagion one to roughly the interval [0, 30], and the expectation of the number of infected
nodes for contagion two to roughly the interval [0, 35]. In both cases, the upper bound is
less than 50, the total number of nodes.
While even for this example the predictions given were nontrivial, one may wonder if the
predictions given by the robust moment closure are always as coarse as those given in Figure
4. This is not the case. Often, they are substantially better. Consider the simulation results
presented in Figure 4, where contagion one spread on a 100 node Erdös-Rényi graph with
connection probability 0.75 with S → I1 transition rate 0.50 and I1 → S transition rates
chosen uniformly at random from the interval [0, 1], contagion two spread on a 100 node
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(b) Evolution of I2 Nodes

(a) Evolution of I1 Nodes

(c) Evolution of Susceptible Nodes

Figure 3: Comparison of the evolution of SI1 SI2 S statistics against predictions made by the
robust moment closure dynamics and mean-field approximation (3.12), where the light red
region gives the bounds from integrating (3.6), and the dark red region gives the bounds
computed by applying Theorem 3. Note that this demonstrates the lack of an ordering
relation between the mean-field approximation and the expectation of the process. The
mean-field approximation overestimates the number of nodes infected with contagion one,
and underestimates the number of nodes infected with contagion two.
Erdös-Rényi graph with connection probability 0.75 with S → I2 transition rate 0.05 and
I1 → S transition rates chosen uniformly at random from the interval [0, 10], and the two
spreading graphs were generated independently. In this case, the upper bound for contagion
one is nearly tight, as is the lower bound for contagion two.
3.4.2. Direct Competition
For SI1 SI2 S, the mean-field approximations often seem to work well as a proxy for the expectation, despite not having a predefined ordering relation with the underlying expectation
of the process. One may wonder if this is generally true. Here, we show by example that it
is not. In particular, for a simple competitive epidemic model we call direct competition, a
mean-field approximation is shown to be a poor proxy for the process’ expectation.
For simplicity, we consider a model with two compartments such that transitions between
each are due to exogeneous processes. Note that this is only a slight distinction from
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(a) Evolution of I1 Nodes

(b) Evolution of I2 Nodes

(c) Evolution of S Nodes

Figure 4: Comparison of the evolution of SI1 SI2 S statistics against predictions made by
the robust moment closure dynamics and mean-field approximation (3.12), where the light
red region gives the bounds from integrating (3.6), and the dark red region gives the bounds
computed by applying Theorem 3. One can see that the optimized predictions (from applying Theorem 3) are substantially better than those which come from direct integration,
as the substantially reduce the uncertainty in the predictions of I1 here.
the SI1 SI2 S process, in that we now disallow people from taking neutral positions (i.e.
susceptibility). As in Section 3.4.1, we label the two infected compartments I1 and I2 . Doing
so allows us to write the corresponding specialization of (2.1) as the system of stochastic
differential equations
dXiI1 =

X

XiI1 XjI2 dQIij1 →I2 − XiI2 XjI1 dQIij2 →I1 ,

(3.14a)

XiI2 XjI1 dQIij2 →I1 − XiI1 XjI2 dQIij1 →I2 .

(3.14b)

j∈V

dXiI2 =

X
j∈V

As in Section 3.4.1, we may take expectations and replace expectations of products by
products of mean-field approximation variables to arrive at the mean-field approximation
φ̇Ii 1 =

X

φ̇Ii 2 =

X

φIi 1 φIj2 µIij1 →I2 − φIi 2 φIj1 µIij2 →I1 ,

(3.15a)

φIi 2 φIj1 µIij2 →I1 − φIi 1 φIj2 µIij1 →I2 ,

(3.15b)

j∈V

j∈V
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(a) Evolution of I1 Nodes

(b) Evolution of I2 Nodes

Figure 5: Comparison of the evolution of the expectation of (3.14) against predictions made
by the robust moment closure dynamics, and the mean-field approximation (3.15), where
the light red region gives the bounds from integrating (3.6), and the dark red region gives
the bounds computed by applying Theorem 3. It can be readily seen that the mean-field
approximation differs significantly from the sample mean of the simulation, which is just
below the upper-bound given by the robust moment-closure dynamics.
where we may use the fact that φ̇Ii 1 + φ̇Ii 2 = 0 and φIi 1 + φIi 2 = 1 to eliminate φIi 2 to obtain
the reduced representation
φ̇Ii 1 =

X

φIi 1 (1 − φIj1 )µIij1 →I2 − (1 − φIi 1 )φIj1 µIij2 →I1 .

(3.16)

j∈V

Figure 5 is illustrative of a typical simulation in contagion one spreads on a 100 node
Erdös-Rényi graph with connection probability 0.5 and I1 → I2 rate 0.005, contagion two
spreads on a 100 node Erdös-Rényi graph with connection probability 0.5 and I2 → I1
rate 0.001, and the graphs are generated independently. The prediction given by the meanfield approximation and the sample mean of the process are substantially different. Indeed,
the sample expectation of the process very nearly attains the upper bound provided by
the robust moment closure, whereas the mean-field approximation comes near to the lower
bound. This example demonstrates clearly that mean-field approximations should not be
used as a proxy for the expectation of an epidemic process in general. They should only be
trusted in particular cases, when approximation guarantees are demonstrated analytically.
Our robust moment closure can be applied broadly. We see in the next chapter how the
methods developed here can be used to certify that a particular stability constraint is
satisfied, allowing for the design of a controller with strong stability properties.
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3.5. Technical Arguments
In this section, we collect some additional detailed technical arguments necessary to justify
some claims made in the body of Chapter 3. Each subsection corresponds to one result
which had been referenced without proof in order to streamline the presentation of the
results in the main text.
3.5.1. A Multivariate Comparison Lemma
Lemma 1 (A Multivariate Comparison Lemma) Consider a system of differential
equations
ẋ = f (x)

(3.17)

with x ∈ Rp , f : Rp → Rp , and possessing a unique, continuously differentiable solution
x(t). Suppose f˜ and f are Lipschitz continuous vector functions defined on Rp×2 , where for
˜
each component i,
fi (z) ≤ f˜i (z, z̃)
˜

(3.18)

holds everywhere on the set

Z̃i , {(z, z, z̃) ∈ R(p×3) | zi ≤ zi = z̃i , zj ≤ zj ≤ z̃j , ∀j 6= i},
˜
˜
˜
and the inequality
fi (z, z̃) ≤ fi (z)
˜ ˜

(3.19)

holds everywhere on the set

Zi , {(z, z, z̃) ∈ R(p×3) | zi = zi ≤ z̃i , zj ≤ zj ≤ z̃j , ∀j 6= i}.
˜
˜
˜
˜
Then, the solutions to the system
x̃˙ = f˜(x, x̃),
˜
x˙ = f (x, x̃),
˜ ˜ ˜
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(3.20)

with initial conditions x(0) = x(0) = x̃(0), satisfy
˜
xi (t) ∈ [xi (t), x̃i (t)]
˜

(3.21)

for all i and t ≥ 0.
Proof : The proof proceeds by a sequence of contradiction arguments, which in particular
use the fact that the solutions x(t), x(t), and x̃(t) are continuously differentiable along
˜
with the inequalities (3.19) and (3.18) in order to demonstrate that the inclusions xi (t) ∈
[xi (t), x̃i (t)] hold for all i ∈ [p], and all times t ≥ 0. Note that the continuous differentiability
˜
of the solutions follows immediately from Lipschitz continuity of the dynamics (see, e.g.,
[112]).
Suppose for purposes of contradiction that x(t) 4 x(t) 4 x̃(t) does not hold for all time.
˜
That then implies that there is some t at which either xi (t) > x̃i (t) or xi (t) < xi (t) occurs.
˜
Let tc be the first time at which such an event occurs. Suppose for now that xi (tc ) > x̃i (tc )
occurs; we argue the other case analogously. By the continuity and differentiability of xi
−
−
−
and x̃i , it then also holds that there exists some time t−
c such that tc < tc , xi (tc ) = x̃i (tc ),
−
−
−
˙ −
and ẋi (t−
c ) > x̃i (tc ). However, since it holds that xi (tc ) ≤ xi (tc ) = x̃i (tc ), and we have
˜
−
−
−
˙ −
that xj (t−
c ) ≤ xj (tc ) ≤ x̃j (tc ), we have by assumption that ẋi (tc ) ≤ x̃i (tc ). This is a
˜
contradiction.

Now, suppose that xi (tc ) < xi (tc ) occurs. By the continuity and differentiability of xi and
˜
−
−
−
xi , it then also holds that there exists some time t−
c such that tc < tc , xi (tc ) = xi (tc ), and
˜
˜
−
−
−
−
x˙ i (t−
c ) > ẋi (tc ). However, since it holds that xi (tc ) = xi (tc ) ≤ x̃i (tc ), and we have that
˜
˜
−
−
−
xj (t−
˙ i (t−
c ) ≤ xj (tc ) ≤ x̃j (tc ) for all j 6= i, we have by assumption that x
c ) ≤ ẋi (tc ). This is
˜
˜
a contradiction, and completes the proof.
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3.5.2. Proof that the dynamics (3.2) satisfy Lemma 1
Note that by using a construction such as [13, Section 5], general continuous-time epidemic process can be represented as a time-homogeneous Markov process with mn states for
fixed set of spreading parameters. As such, the compartmental membership probabilities
generated from any particular initial state X can be represented as sums of states evolving
as solutions to a mn -dimensional linear system, and so are unique and continuously differentiable. Likewise, since each term of the dynamics (3.2) is a sum of Lipschitz continuous
functions, it follows that the dynamics (3.2) are also Lipschitz continuous. It remains to
verify that the inequalities required by Lemma 1 are satisfied on the appropriate subsets of
the state space.
For purposes of brevity, we do not write out the calculations explicitly. However, they are
all transparent enough such that they can be described in a rigorous manner at a high level
of abstraction. Choose some node label i ∈ V and some compartmental label ` ∈ L. We
wish to show that
dE[Xi` ]
(x) ≤ x̃˙ `i (x, x̃)
dt
˜
holds everywhere on

0

0

0

X̃i` , {(x, x, x̃) ∈ R(V×L)×3 | x`i ≤ xi = x̃`i , x`j ≤ x`j ≤ x̃`j , (j, `0 ) ∈ V × L},
˜
˜
˜
where we define

dE[Xi` ]
dt (x)

as the value of the derivative defined on the left-hand-side of (2.3),

evaluated with first moment x`i = E[Xi` ]. Note that strictly speaking,

dE[Xi` ]
dt (x)

is set-valued,

as we do not specify the value of the second-moment terms on the right-hand side of (2.3).
Our analysis proceeds by demonstrating that the desired inequality holds for any possible
value of

dE[Xi` ]
dt (x).

Note that this does not imply that (2.3) is a differential inclusion, as our

system evolves from a known initial condition, and as such all moments are fully defined at
all times (as the solutions to a system of mn ordinary differential equations).
Consider all terms of the function

dE[Xi` ]
dt (x)

with positive coefficients. Each corresponds
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`

dE[X ]
to a term in x̃˙ `i (x, x̃) which over-approximates the term of dt i (x) on the set X̃i` . Like˜
dE[X ` ]
wise, all terms of the function dt i (x) with negative coefficients corresponds to a term

in x̃˙ `i (x, x̃) which under-approximates the true value. Since association to a negative coef˜
ficient inverts the nature of the inequality associated to the approximation, every term in
the function x̃˙ `i (x, x̃) over-approximates the corresponding term in
˜
which demonstrates the claimed inequality.

dE[Xi` ]
dt (x)

on the set X̄i` ,

We now wish to show that the inequality

x˙ `i (x, x̃) ≤
˜ ˜

dE[Xi` ]
(x)
dt

holds everywhere on the set

0

0

0

Xi` , {(x, x, x̃) ∈ R(V×L)×3 | x`i = xi ≤ x̃`i , x`j ≤ x`j ≤ x̃`j , (j, `0 ) ∈ V × L}.
˜
˜
˜
˜
Consider all terms of the function

dE[Xi` ]
dt (x)

with positive coefficients. Each corresponds to a
dE[X ` ]

term in x̃˙ `i (x, x̃) which under-approximates the term of dt i (x) on the set Xi` . Likewise, all
˜
˜
dE[Xi` ]
terms of the function dt (x) with negative coefficients corresponds to a term in x̃˙ `i (x, x̃)
˜
dE[X ` ]
which over-approximates the term of dt i (x) on the set Xi` . Since association to a negative
˜
coefficient inverts the nature of the inequality associated to the approximation, every term
dE[X ` ]

in the function x˙ `i (x, x̃) under-approximates the corresponding term in dt i (x) on the set
˜ ˜
`
Xi , which demonstrates the claimed inequality. This completes the proof.

˜
3.5.3. Proof of Proposition 1
This result relies directly on a well-known comparison lemma from the theory of monotone
dynamical systems, the Kamke-Müller lemma (see, e.g. [116]). In its most basic form, the
Kamke-Müller lemma gives comparisons between the solutions of one dynamical system,
evolving from two distinct initial conditions which satisfy some ordering. However, it is
well known that this type of comparison can be made for the solutions of two distinct
dynamical systems, provided certain ordering conditions hold. Specifically, the result we
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use in this paper is stated as follows, where we have adapted material from [116, Section
3.1] to the notation used here:
Lemma 2 (Extended Kamke-Müller Lemma) Let f and g be Lipschitz continuous
vector functions on Rp , and consider the nonlinear dynamical system
ẏ = f (y)
ż = g(z).
If for each i, the inequality fi (q) ≤ gi (q̄) holds everywhere on the set
¯

Qi , (q, q̄) ∈ Rp×2 | qi = q̄i , qj ≤ q̄j , j 6= i ,
¯
¯
¯
and it holds that y(t0 ) = z(t0 ), then it also holds that yi (t) ≤ zi (t) for all t ≥ t0 , and all
i ∈ [p].
Now, consider taking y T = [x̄T , −xT ]T , and z T = [x̃T , −xT ]T , and let p = 4n, where we let
¯
˜
each j ∈ [mn] represent exactly one (i, `) ∈ V × L. If for each (i, `) ∈ V × L, we have that
[fi` (q), f¯i` (q)] ∈ [fi` (q̄), f˜i` (q̄)], on the corresponding set Qj , and (x(0), x̄(0)) = (x(0), x̃(0)),
¯
˜
¯ ¯
¯
˜
`
`
`
`
Lemma 2 implies [xi (t), x̄i (t)] ∈ [xi (t), x̃i (t)] for all (i, `) ∈ V × L, and for all t ≥ 0, as
¯
˜
claimed.

3.5.4. Proof of Theorem 2
Since (2.1) is a Markov process on a finite state space (with mn states), it follows that the
solutions of (2.1) are unique and continuous. The dynamics (2.3) are Lipschitz continuous
as they are a sum of Lipschitz continuous functions, and so the solutions of (3.6) are unique
and continuous as well.
Moreover, it is straightforward demonstrate that [x`i , x̄`i ] ⊆ [0, 1] for all t. In particular,
¯
note that the expression x̄˙ `i (x, x̄) is non-positive if x̄`i = 1, and non-negative if x̄`i = 0.
¯
`
Since x̄i (t) is unique and continuous with respect to t and x̄`i (0) = Xi` (0) ∈ {0, 1}, we
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then have that x̄`i (t) ∈ [0, 1]. Likewise, we have that x˙ `i (x, x̄) is nondecreasing if x`i = 0. As
¯ ¯
¯
`
above, this demonstrates that xi (t) ≥ 0 for all t. From the standard Kamke-Müller lemma
¯
0
0
(see [116, Section 3.1]) and the fact that x̄˙ `i ≥ x˙ `i holds wherever x̄`i = x`i and x̄`j ≥ x`j hold
¯
¯
¯
for all (j, `0 ) 6= (i, `), we have that x`i ≤ x̄`i for all t. Hence, xi (t) ∈ [0, 1] for all time t ≥ 0.
¯
¯
It remains to verify that the inclusion [xi (t), x̄i (t)] ⊆ [xi (t), x̃i (t)] holds for all t ≥ 0. Ho¯
˜
wever, this is an immediate consequence of Proposition 1, and the definition of the complimentary bounding operator. This ends the proof.



3.5.5. Proof of Theorem 3
We prove both bounds by variational arguments. Define ΨG as the set of all possible
marginal compartmental membership probabilities for the graph, i.e.
(
ΨG ,

y ∈ RV×L
≥0 |

)
X

yi` = 1, ∀ i ∈ V

.

(3.22)

`∈L

Allow the set Λt to be the set of all marginal compartmental membership probability assignments permitted by the approximations generated by integrating the dynamics (3.6) with
initial condition x(0) = X(0) = x̄(0) over the interval [0, t]. This gives the identity
¯
n
o
Λt , y ∈ ΨG |yi` ∈ [x`i (t), x̄`i (t)], ∀i ∈ V, ` ∈ L .
¯

Since M(X) is a sum of indicator random variables, it follows that E[M(X(t))|X(0)] can
take the value M(y) for any y ∈ Λt . By maximizing over all such y, it follows that
E[M(X(t))|X(0)] ≤ maxy∈Λt {M(y)} holds, and is tight because y ∈ Λt . It remains to show
that maxy∈Λt {M(y)} evaluates to the right hand side of (3.9). We note that maxy∈Λt {M(y)}
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is equivalent to the sum of n linear programs

maximize
yi ∈RL
≥0

X

yi`

(3.23a)

`∈M

subject to yi` ∈ [x`i , x̄`i ], ∀i ∈ V, ` ∈ L,
¯
X
`
yi = 1.

(3.23b)
(3.23c)

`∈L

We now solve (3.23) analytically. By considering the constraint (3.23c), we have that at
P
P
P
all feasible points of (3.23) satisfy `∈M yi` = 1 − `∈L\M yi` . As such, if `∈M x̄`i and
P
1 − `∈L\M x`i take distinct values, only the smaller of the two values is attainable on the
¯
feasible polytope. As the objective is monotonically increasing in yi` for all ` ∈ M, it then
P
P
follows that the optimal value of (3.23) is bounded above by min{ `∈M x̄`i , 1− `∈L\M x`i }.
¯
Noting that the program (3.23) is guaranteed to be feasible since the interval constraints
(3.23b) are generated so as to contain the true underlying marginal probabilities, we can
finish the argument by showing that there exists a feasible point which attains the value
P
P
min{ `∈M x̄`i , 1 − `∈L\M x`i }.
¯
P
P
P
P
Suppose that `∈M x̄`i > 1 − `∈L\M x`i . It follows that `∈M x̄`i + `∈L\M x`i > 1, from
¯
¯
`
which feasibility of (3.23) and the fact that each yi is lower bounded by the corresponding
P
P
value x`i implies that there exists a yi such that `∈M yi` = 1− `∈L\M x`i . This point attains
¯
¯
P
P
P
P
`
`
the value min{ `∈M x̄i , 1 − `∈L\M xi }. Now, suppose that `∈M x̄`i ≤ 1 − `∈L\M x`i
¯
¯
P
P
holds. It follows that `∈M x̄`i + `∈L\M x`i ≤ 1, which from feasibility of (3.23) and the fact
¯
`
that yi are upper-bounded by the corresponding value x̄`i implies that there exists a yi such
P
P
P
P
that `∈M x̄`i = 1 − `∈L\M yi` , which attains the value min{ `∈M x̄`i , 1 − `∈L\M x`i }.
¯
This completes the proof for the upper-bound given in the statement of the theorem.
To prove the lower bound given, we note that by definition, it holds that miny∈Λt {M(y)} ≤
E[M(X(t))|X(0)]. As with the case for the upper-bound, miny∈Λt {M(y)} can be decomposed
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as the sum of the n linear programs

minimize
yi ∈RL
≥0

X

yi`

(3.24a)

`∈M

subject to yi` ∈ [x`i , x̄`i ], ∀i ∈ V, ` ∈ L,
¯
X
`
yi = 1,

(3.24b)
(3.24c)

`∈L

P
which we can solve analytically. We have that all feasible points of (3.23) satisfy `∈M yi` =
P
P
P
1 − `∈L\M yi` . As such, if `∈M x`i and 1 − `∈L\M x̄`i take distinct values, only the larger
¯
of the two values is attainable on the feasible polytope. As the objective is monotonically
increasing in yi` for all ` ∈ M, it then follows that the optimal value of (3.23) is bounded
P
P
below by max{ `∈M x`i , 1 − `∈L\M x̄`i }. Noting that the program (3.23) is guaranteed
¯
to be feasible since the interval constraints (3.23b) are generated so as to contain the true
underlying marginal probabilities, we can finish the argument by showing that there exists
P
P
a feasible point which attains the value max{ `∈M x`i , 1 − `∈L\M x̄`i }.
¯
P
P
P
P
Suppose that `∈M x`i > 1 − `∈L\M x̄`i . It follows that `∈M x`i + `∈L\M x̄`i > 1, from
¯
¯
`
which feasibility of (3.23) and the fact that each yi is upper-bounded by the corresponding
P
P
value x̄`i implies that there exists a yi such that `∈M x`i = 1− `∈L\M yi` . This point attains
¯
P
P
P
P
`
`
the value max{ `∈M xi , 1 − `∈L\M x̄i }. Now, suppose that `∈M x`i ≤ 1 − `∈L\M x̄`i
¯
¯
P
P
`
`
holds. It follows that `∈M xi + `∈L\M x̄i ≤ 1, which from feasibility of (3.23) and the fact
¯
that yi` are lower-bounded by the corresponding value x`i implies that there exists a yi such
¯
P
P
P
P
`
`
that `∈M yi = 1 − `∈L\M x̄i , which attains the value max{ `∈M x`i , 1 − `∈L\M x̄`i }.
¯
This completes the proof.
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CHAPTER 4 : Economic Model Predictive Control for Continuous-time Epidemics
In this chapter, we develop a class of predictive control laws which quickly drives an epidemic
to a set of states in which all undesirable phenomena are eliminated. The controller choses
actions so as to minimize the incurred economic cost of the applied control actions, while
satisfying a specified expectation decay constraint. We show that these actions, while taken
to explicitly satisfy only a local decay, in fact guarantee a strong notion of stability in
the evolution of the stochastic process (2.1). This type of convergence guarantee improves
significantly on the usual mean-field stability guaranteed in most prior work [8,12,43,44,46,
50,81,98–100,102–104]. Indeed, it provides a similar notion of stochastic stability as studied
in [57, 101], but for a substantially more general class of processes and actuation methods.
Note, in particular, that the results in [57, 101] regard only SIS process where actions
are modeled by varying the rate at which infectious nodes heal over a continuous range
of admissible values. The method here applies to any general continuous-time epidemic
process, and is agnostic to the particular details of the action space.
Organization

The developments progress in three stages. First, we introduce the con-

troller to be studied, and briefly review literature from economic model predictive control
(Section 4.1). Then, we conduct a stability analysis on the designed controller, to demonstrate that any undesirable phenomena are driven out of the network in sublinear time in
expectation (Section 4.2). Finally, we demonstrate the performance of the controller on a
•

numerical example (Section 4.3).

4.1. Control Framework
In this section, we detail the mathematical framework for the controller to be analyzed later
in the chapter. We study the control of continuous-time epidemic processes, as defined in
Chapter 2. Papers which consider epidemic processes often investigate conditions which
guarantee that an undesirable behavior end quickly (see, e.g., [8, 12, 43, 44, 46, 50, 57, 81, 98–
104] and references therein), where the convergence is typically studied under mean-field
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approximation. As such, we consider here the design of a control law which guarantees a
similar notion of stability, while allocating control resources online in a way which minimizes
the incurred economic cost. Because we cannot generally trust the accuracy of mean-field
approximations, we use the results developed in Chapter 3 so as to provide stochastic
convergence guarantees on the time which is required for the undesirable phenomena to be
driven out of the network, to provide a similar notion of stability as is done in [57, 101].
The controller we study in this chapter takes actions which incorporate sampled-data observations. That is, at every time t in a discrete set of sampling times T∆t , {t ∈ R≥0 | t =
∆tk, k ∈ Z≥0 }, the controller observes the state X(t) of the process, and then decides which
action a to apply, from among a finite set of possible control actions A, each of which induces a particular set of spreading parameters Θ(a) = {λ(a), µ(a)} on the process (2.1). Note
that there are many works which have studied predictive control with discrete actions which
precede this text [117–122], and so this should not be seen as a significant novel feature of
our work.
The controller computes control actions by selecting a feasible, but possibly suboptimal,
solution to the optimization problem

minimize{C(a) | J(X(t), a) ≤ 0},
a∈A

(4.1)

where the function C maps actions to their cost of implementation, and J is a chosen
constraint function designed to enforce stability in the controlled process. We consider the
case in which the stability constraint function J(X(t), a) takes the form
J(X(t), a) , EΘ(a) [M(X(t + ∆t)) − M(X(t))e−r∆t |X(t)],

(4.2)

where M is defined as the total number in the network of nodes taking membership in the
P
set of undesirable compartments M ⊂ L in the network, M(X) , i∈V,`∈M Xi` , and r
is a chosen positive constant describing the desired decay rate of the closed-loop system.
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Note that we use Θ(a) in (4.2) to denote the measure of (2.1) under control action a, as
the chosen spreading parameters fully define the processes’ measure, and should cause no
confusion. As it will be helpful later in the discussion, we let the notation umpc define an
implicit, nonlinear control law which applies actions which are feasible to (4.1) at all times.
Because it is a common feature of epidemic processes, we assume that the set of states in
which no undesirable behavior is exhibited is absorbing, i.e. if X(t) ∈ {Y ∈ X | M(Y ) = 0}
holds, X(t0 ) ∈ {Y ∈ X | M(Y ) = 0} for all t0 ≥ t. Note that this assumption is only
used superficially in our later analysis, and can be relaxed to the case in which the set
{Y ∈ X | M(Y ) = 0} is control invariant without requiring any innovation.
The choice of objective function of (4.1) is made to optimize the economic performance of
the realized controller, as opposed to a traditional system-theoretic property (e.g. weighted
distance from a set point). As such, the control law umpc is said to be an economic model
predictive controller (EMPC). While economic model predictive controllers operate in the
same receding-horizon manner as traditional model predictive control, it is often the case
that guaranteeing desirable system properties requires incorporating context-specific considerations to the controller’s design (see [122–128] for relevant background). This is the
purpose of including the stability constraint J(X(t), a) ≤ 0. Abstractly, such constraints are
common features of economic (and nonlinear) model predictive controllers (see [123, Section
3.3] and [129, Section 3], respectively). However, the particular functions chosen varies depending on the system under study, and the property to be enforced. We see in Section
4.2 that with the choice of J as in (4.2), feasibility of (4.1) is enough to guarantee the a
strong notion of stability on the closed-loop process. In particular, the closed-loop process
will arrive in a set where M(X(t)) = 0 in time which grows sublinearly with the size of
the network in expectation. Similar stability guarantees were detailed for priority-order
allocation strategies in [57, 101], where resource allocation was modeled by varying the rate
at which a node heals over a continuous range of possible values.
Generally, it may be difficult to find a control action which is feasible to (4.1). As such,
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we assume that the controller has access to a stabilizing auxiliary control law uaux which
provides such an action at any state. Note that this assumption is common in the economic
and nonlinear model predictive control literature (see [123, Section 3.3] and [129, Section
3], respectively). This is due to the difficulty of solving (4.1) to global optimality. In the
context of epidemic containment, we expect finding feasible control actions to be easy: if
we are distributing medication, we may give medication to everyone, if we are distributing
protective clothing, we may give protective clothing to everyone, if we are deciding who
to quarantine, we may quarantine everyone, if we are protecting against malware, we may
reset all devices simultaneously. In all such cases, if we do so, the epidemic will die out
quickly. The interesting task in these problems is not in finding a feasible control law, as a
conservative one will work. The interesting task is in designing a control law which takes
nontrivial actions, and still provides a reasonable notion of stability. We see in Section
4.2 that umpc attains such behavior in principle, and in Section 4.3 that such behavior is
attained on numerical examples.

4.2. Convergence Analysis
In this section, we analyze the convergence of the controller induced by applying suboptimal
solutions of (4.1), where we choose J(X(t), a) as in (4.2). Abstractly, we are most concerned
with ensuring that the epidemic attains membership in the set of states with no undesirable
behavior quickly. To formalize this notion, we define the elimination time of the process as
follows:
Definition 3 (Elimination Time) The elimination time τelim of a continuous-time epidemic is the first time at which no nodes take membership in the set of undesirable comP
partments, i.e. τelim , inf{t ≥ 0 | M(X(t)) = 0}, where M(X(t)) , i∈V,`∈M Xi` (t).
We seek a guarantee on the expected elimination time of the continuous-time epidemic
process under the designed EMPC scheme. Since in many cases, the set {Y ∈ X | M(Y ) = 0}
is attained in finite-time with probability one (e.g. controlling an SIS process to eliminate
infection), it follows that any notion of asymptotic convergence here will be uninformative.
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For our results to be meaningful, we must provide a strong bound on the time of convergence.
The analysis that we perform to arrive at an upper bound for the expectation of the elimination time τelim relies critically on knowledge of the evolution of the expected number
nodes exhibiting undesirable behavior. We first analyze this expectation (in Section 4.2.1),
and then proceed to analyze the expectation of the elimination time (in Section 4.2.2).
4.2.1. Bounding the Expected Number of Exposed and Infected Nodes
We now demonstrate that the proposed controller uniformly exponentially eliminates the
undesirable behavior in expectation, with respect to the set of sampling times T∆t .
Theorem 4 (Exponential Elimination of SEIV under EMPC) Let X(0) be the
initial state of the continuous-time epidemic process (2.1), choose any r > 0, and any
∆t > 0. Suppose an auxiliary control policy uaux exists such that

Euaux [M(X(t + ∆t))|X(t)] ≤ M(X(t))e−r∆t ,

(4.3)

for all t ∈ T∆t . Then, the process {X(t)} as defined by (2.1) under the policy umpc satisfies

Eumpc [M(X(t))|X(0)] ≤ M(X(0))e−rt ,

(4.4)

for all t ∈ T∆t . Moreover, the bound (4.4) is tight.
Proof : See Section 4.4.1.



The proof of Theorem 4 follows from an induction argument, which makes appeals to the
expectation decay constraint (4.3), fundamental tools from the theory of probability, and
the decay property encoded in the actions contained in feasible set of (4.1) through the
constraint J(X(t), a) ≤ 0. The importance of Theorem 4 is in allowing us to analyze the
elimination time of the process. We perform this analysis in the following subsection.
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4.2.2. Bounding the Expected Elimination Time
While it is intuitive that a continuous-time epidemic process in which the total count of
nodes exhibiting undesirable behavior decays exponentially quickly might have a small
elimination time, there is no immediately apparent link between the two concepts. Note
that a bound on Eumpc [M(X(t))|X(0)] provides little direct insight as to the distribution
of the process {M(X(t))}. Moreover, the decay property guaranteed by Theorem 4 is not
uniform exponential elimination; the exponential decay is only guaranteed on a countable
subset of times. As such, we may only infer anything about the expected number of exposed
and infected nodes on a small subset of times, and must use this information to prove a
result on the elimination time of the process. There is no previously established technique
for doing so in the literature, as far as we can tell. We provide a novel result which
accomplishes this in the following theorem.
Theorem 5 (Upper-Bound on Expected Elimination Time) Suppose a continuoustime epidemic process process evolves under the policy umpc , where J(X(t), a) is defined by
(4.2). Then, the expected elimination time satisfies

Eumpc [τelim |X(0)] ≤ τ1 +

e−rτ1
∆tM(X(0)),
1 − e−r∆t

(4.5)

where τ1 is the first time in the sampling time set T∆t such that Eumpc [M(t)|X(0)] is less
than one, which can be shown to be



log(M(X(0)))
τ1 =
∆t,
r∆t

(4.6)

where dae denotes the smallest integer larger than a. Moreover, the bound (4.5) is tight.
Proof : The essence of this argument relies on approximating the integral which defines
the expected elimination time. The approximation occurs in three steps:(i) representing the
integral as an integral of the distribution function of the elimination time random variable,
(ii) finding a convergent, closed-form approximation to the distribution function of the
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elimination time random variable, and (iii) evaluating the integral of the approximated
distribution function.
Since τelim is a non-negative random variable which takes values on the real line, we may
use the layer-cake representation of expectation to identify the equivalence
Z
Eumpc [τelim |X(0)] ,

∞

1 − Fτelim (h)dh

(4.7)

0

where Fτelim is the distribution function of τelim , i.e. Fτelim (t) , Pr(τelim ≤ t). Since once
M(X(τ )) = 0 for some τ, it holds for all t ≥ τ, we have the identity Pr(τelim ≤ t) =
Pr(M(X(t)) = 0), which is equivalent to the expression 1−Pr(τelim ≤ t) = Pr(M(X(t)) > 0).
As such, we may construct an upper-bound on 1 − Fτelim (t) by constructing an upper-bound
on Pr(M(X(t)) > 0). We do so using the decay properties already proven of the designed
controller. In particular, Theorem 4 gives that
−rt
0]
E[x
umpc [M(X(t))] ≤ M(X(0))e

(4.8)

holds for all t ∈ T∆t , and so we may upper-bound Pr(M(X(t)) > 0) for all t ∈ T∆t by the
optimal value of

maximize
p∈Ψ[n]0

subject to

n
X
k=1
n
X

pk

(4.9a)

kpk ≤ M(X(0))e−rb ∆t c∆t ,
t

(4.9b)

k=0

where bac denotes the largest integer smaller than a, and Ψ[n]0 is the set of all possible
marginal probability assignments over [n]0 , so chosen because the number of exposed and
infected nodes in the graph must take value on [n]0 , and the constraint (4.9b) enforces the
expectation inequality (4.8). Since the left-hand-side of inequality (4.9b) is least sensitive
to increases in p1 for any value pk with k ≥ 1, one may show that the optimal value of (4.9)
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can be computed as min{1, M(X(0))e−rb ∆t c∆t }. Hence,
t

t

Pr(M(X(t)) > 0) ≤ min{1, M(X(0))e−rb ∆t c∆t }

(4.10)

holds for all t ∈ T∆t , where the bound (4.10) is tight.
Since the distribution function Fτelim is non-decreasing with respect to t by definition, and
1 − Fτelim (t) = Pr(M(X(t)) > 0), we have that Pr(M(X(t)) > 0) is non-increasing with
respect to t. Hence (4.10) holds for all times t ≥ 0. Thus, (4.7) and (4.10) together imply
Z
Eumpc [τelim |X(0)] ≤

∞

n
o
h
min 1, M(X(0))e−rb ∆t c∆t dh.

(4.11)

0

We now seek a closed-form expression of the right hand side of (4.11). Defining τ1 as
τ1 , inf{t ∈ R≥0 | M(x0 )e−rb ∆t c∆t ≤ 1},
t

we can evaluate τ1 to satisfy the claimed identity (4.6), and can then rewrite (4.11) as

Eumpc [τelim |X(0)] ≤ τ1 +

∞
X

M(X(0))∆t e−r∆t

j

.

(4.12)

τ1
j= ∆t

Evaluating the tail of the geometric sum in (4.12) gives

Eumpc [τelim |X(0)] ≤ τ1 +

e−rτ1
∆tM(X(0)),
1 − e−r∆t

which is as stated in the theorem’s hypothesis.
Finally, note that since the bound on the distribution function Fτelim derived is optimal at all
times among all such bounds which use only the bound on the number of nodes in the graph
in the set of undesirable compartments provided by Theorem 4, and the bound provided by
Theorem 4 is itself tight, it follows as well that the upper bound (4.11) is optimal among
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all such guarantees that can be provided by the controller. This completes the proof.



The bound (4.11) grows sub-linearly with respect to the size of the set of nodes which
are exhibiting undesirable behavior, i.e. M(X(0)). This then certifies that the designed
controller eliminates undesirable behavior from the network quickly, as hoped. Note that
the proof given for Theorem 5 relies critically on the fact that Eumpc [M(X(t))|X(0)] decays
quickly, as if this were not the case, the approximation used for the integrand would not
be integrable, and the resulting approximation would be trivial. Moreover, the argument
relies on the topology of the state-space of epidemic processes in order to guarantee that the
controller attains membership in the targeted set of states quickly. Indeed, if it were not
the case that the optimal value of (4.9) is bounded away from one after only a short amount
of time, our attempt at approximating the expectation of τelim meaningfully would fail as
well. Since this occurs only because M(X) must take values on the set [n]0 , it follows that
such a convergence argument will not generalize to economic model predictive controllers
on general state spaces. Indeed, it is fortunate that such a result holds in our setting.

4.3. A Numerical Example
In this section, we present a concrete application for the developed EMPC framework. Note
that while we only present one example here, the general principles contained in Sections
4.1 and 4.2 are not constrained to this context. Indeed, whenever anyone should want to
consider a new application, all one needs to do is specify an action space A, a parameter
map Θ, an auxiliary control law uaux , and an appropriate local optimization method. In
particular, the moment closure provided in Chapter 3 and the convergence analysis provided
in Section 4.2 both generalize to any particular continuous-time epidemic control problem
one may wish to consider.
The performance realized will of course depend on the particulars of the context considered.
However, as the optimization induced by nonlinear model predictive control is inherently
nonconvex in general [129, Section 3], and the dynamics of the process (2.1) are inherently
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nonlinear and stochastic, we should not expect to be able to develop an optimization method
which works uniformly well in all contexts. We expect that defining particular instances of
the control framework here can be a source of future work for those interested in the control
of continuous-time epidemic processes.
4.3.1. Quarantine Model for SEIV
We consider the problem of strategically removing nodes from the spreading graph in order
to efficiently drive a Susceptible-Exposed-Infected-Vigilant (SEIV ) epidemic to extinction
quickly. This is a mathematical model for the practical problem of deciding who to quarantine, and for how long, in the presence of an epidemic contagion. Note that, in the context
of this problem, the maximum realized resource use rate is the number of quarantine beds
needed throughout the course of the epidemic, and as such provides a reasonable index
for evaluating the cost of the controller. Furthermore, given that world governments are
currently in the process of providing disease control agencies with sweeping authority to
quarantine individuals exposed to infectious disease (see, e.g., the recent U.S. bill [130])
despite recommendations from the medical community (see, e.g., [7]), understanding the
mathematics of when quarantining is necessary for the control of a disease is important in
practice. We show here that the proposed EMPC reduces the number of people required to
be held in quarantine in order to attain a particular rate of decay.
Formally, the SEIV process can be written as the stochastic process
dXiS = XiV dPiV →S − XiS dPS→V
−
i

X

XiS XjE dQS→E;E
+ XiS XjI dQS→E;I
,
ij
ij

j∈Ni

dXiE =

X

XiS XjE dQS→E;E
+ XiS XjI dQS→E;I
− XiE dPE→I
,
i
ij
ij

j∈Ni

(4.13)

dXiI = XiE dPiE→I − XiI dPI→V
,
i
dXiV = XiI dPI→V
+ XiS dPS→V
− XiV dPVi →S ,
i
i
where nodes in the Susceptible compartment (represented by S) are considered healthy,
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nodes in the Exposed compartment (represented by E) are considered to have come into
contact with a contagion but are asymptomatic, nodes in the Infected compartment (represented by I) are considered to be infectious and symptomatic, and nodes in the Vigilant
compartment (represented by V ) are considered to be actively taking actions to protect
themselves against infection. Note that (4.13) is not a process of the form (2.1), as both nodes which are exposed and infected cause susceptible nodes to become exposed. This is why
the measures dQS→E;E
and dQS→E;I
have a third parameter, denoting which compartment
ij
ij
is causing the transition (E and I, respectively). However, the results analogous to those
presented in Chapter 3 can be verified to hold for (4.13), as the additional summands to not
materially change our arguments. It is straightforward to show that expectation dynamics
of the SEIV process can be written as
X
dE[XiS ]
βij E[XiS XjE ] + γij E[XiS XjI ],
= αi E[XiV ] − ξi E[XiS ] −
dt
j∈Ni

dE[XiE ]
dt

=

X

βij E[XiS XjE ] + γij E[XiS XjI ] − δi E[XiE ],
(4.14)

j∈Ni

dE[XiI ]

= δi E[XiE ] − ηi E[XiI ],
dt
dE[XiV ]
= ηi E[XiI ] + ξi E[XiS ] − αi E[XiV ],
dt
where the constants αi , βij , γij , δi , ηi , and ξi are the various spreading parameters of the
process. One can check by inspection that the rates αi , δi and ξi determine how quickly
nodes transition between various stages of infection and vigilance, and the rates βij and
γij determine the occurrence of contact between agents i and j which result in infection
spreading from agent j to node i.
We represent control actions here by an n-dimensional vector a in which ai = 1 if and
only if the i’th node is removed from the spreading graph (i.e., quarantined), and ai = 0
otherwise. With this notation, we may represent our action space as A = {0, 1}n . We model
quarantining a node by removing its outgoing edges from the spreading graph, i.e. we have
for all pairs (i, j), the exposure rates have the functional forms βij (aj ) , β̄ij − β̄ij aj , and
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γij (aj ) , γ̄ij − γ̄ij aj , where each aj is restricted to the set {0, 1}. For simplicity, we assume
P
that cost of quarantining nodes is additive, and so may be represented as C(a) , i∈V ai .
In this context, the value of the cost function evaluated for a particular control action
a is representative of the number of beds required to implement the quarantine strategy.
Applying economic model predictive control to this problem explicitly attempts to minimize
the number of beds used in execution.
Note that our work here is not the first to study the problem of quarantine management
for models of biological disease. Typical works from the pre-existing literature study quarantine management problems for mean-field epidemic models, and model a node being in
quarantine by adding an additional compartment to the compartmental spreading model,
which does not interact with any other compartments (see, e.g., [23, 131]). The control
design is done by way of varying the rate at which nodes transition to the quarantine compartment, with actuating the rate coming at a given cost. Our model here is similar, in
that our quarantined nodes do not interact with the rest of the network, and placing the
node in quarantine comes at a cost to the controller. Note, however, that our work here is
the first work which considers quarantine optimization for stochastic networked epidemics
and discrete control actions. In this sense, it is novel.
4.3.2. An Auxiliary Control Law for Quarantine Optimization
As noted in Section 4.1, our control scheme assumes the existence of an auxiliary control
law which always satisfies the required expectation decay constraint. While specifying an
all-purpose auxiliary control law is outside of the scope of this paper, we demonstrate here
how to construct one for the quarantining problem, with the hope that it will provide insight
on how to do so in other application areas.
The policy we design for the quarantine problem, which we refer to as the total quarantine
policy, removes nodes which are either exposed to or infected by the disease at each time
that the state of the process is observed. Intuitively, this is a mathematical model for
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what is implemented in the event of serious disease outbreak (e.g., the response to the
Ebola epidemic of 2014 [7]). This procedure is guaranteed mathematically to eliminate the
contagion from the network exponentially quickly, provided the control horizon is sufficiently
long, as we show in the following result.
Theorem 6 (Convergence of Total Quarantine Policy) Suppose ηi and δi are distinct
for all i ∈ V, choose r < min{ηi , δi } for all i, and ∆t to satisfy
log(max{δi , ηi }) − log(|ηi − δi |)
≤ ∆t,
min{δi , ηi } − r

(4.15)

for all i ∈ V. Suppose further that at each t ∈ T∆t , an action from the total quarantine
policy utot ,
utot (X) ,




ai = 1, ∀i s.t. XiE + XiI > 0,

(4.16)



ai = 0, ∀i s.t. XiE + XiI = 0,
is applied and held constant until time t + ∆t. Then, the evolution of the SEIV process
satisfies
Eutot [M(X(t + ∆t))|X(t)] ≤ M(X(t))e−r∆t
for all X(t) ∈ X , and each t ∈ T∆t , where we defined M(X) =
Proof : See Section 4.4.2.

P

i∈V

(4.17)
XiE + XiI .


Note that the statement requiring ηi and δi to be distinct is one of explanatory convenience.
In particular, our analysis relies on solving a particular system of linear ordinary differential
equations, of which ηi and δi are the eigenvalues. By requiring that they be distinct, we
simplify the required proofs to only having to consider one possible type of solution. Of
course, the analysis can be done just as easily in the case that δi = ηi , however the principle
components of the argument are the same, and thus are left out of the paper. It should
also be noted that the sampling time bound given by (4.15) is conservative. This inequality
was derived for the express purpose of providing a simple inequality which can be checked
easily, at the expense of applying approximations.
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The total quarantine policy analyzed in Theorem 6 is conservative. It removes more nodes
from the network than is required to eliminate the epidemic exponentially quickly. The
numerical experiments in Section 4.3.4 verify that the proposed EMPC finds actions which
are much more efficient than the total quarantine policy.
4.3.3. Global Optimization Method for Quarantine Optimization
We now consider the task of of finding good approximate solutions to (4.1). Note that
since the SEIV process evolves on a state space with 4n elements, evaluating the stability
constraint J(X, a) ≤ 0 precisely is in general difficult. As such, we use the results developed
in Chapter 3 to evaluate the constraint conservatively. In particular, at a state X(0) and
for a particular control action a, define the function
¯
J(X(0),
a) = ψ(X(0), a) − M(X(0))e−r∆t ,

o
` (t) . Since J(X(0),
¯
x
a) ≥
`∈L\M i
¯
¯
J(X(0), a), it follows that J(X(0),
a) ≤ 0 implies J(X(0), a) ≤ 0. Hence, computing an ap-

where the term ψ(X(0), a) ,

P

i∈V min

nP

(4.18)

`
`∈M x̄i (t), 1 −

P

proximate solution which is feasible to
¯
minimize{C(a) | J(X(t),
a) ≤ 0},
a∈A

(4.19)

also computes an approximate solution which is feasible to (4.1). Note that (4.19) is itself
still not easy to solve: it is an integer programming problem. While there are relatively
sophisticated methods for solving various classes of integer programs, they all require the
presence of some special structure to work well, as integer programs are in general N P-hard.
Moreover, even computing suboptimality bounds for arbitrary integer programming problem
is difficult [132,133]. As such, we use a randomized multistart search to approximately solve
(4.19). This is detailed in Algorithm 1.
In general it may take a very long time to find the optimal solution, however it is theoretically
guaranteed that Algorithm 1 will find the globally optimal solution of (4.1) eventually, and
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Algorithm 1 Multi-Start Local Descent
Initialization:
1: Define feasible auxiliary solution aaux = uaux (X(t));
2: Initialize set of candidate solutions A? , {aaux };
3: Define maximum iteration count kmax ;
4: Set k = 0.
5: Run main program;
Main Program:
1: while k ≤ kmax do
2:
Sample a from distribution with support A;
3:
if a is feasible then
4:
I , {i ∈ V | ai = 1};
5:
if a − ei is feasible for some i ∈ I then
6:
a ← a − ei ;
7:
Go to 3;
8:
else
9:
A? ← A? ∪ {a}.
10:
end if
11:
else
12:
Return a infeasible;
13:
end if
14:
k ← k + 1;
15: end while
16: Return a? = argmina∈A? {C(a)};
in finite time, so long as kmax is set to infinity. This is moreso a nice theoretical guarantee,
than a practically important matter. Of course, the amount of time required to find a
feasible solution of a particular quality will be affected by the particular choice of sampling
distribution, and it is likely that the optimal solution will not be found for quite some time.
We detail the particular sampling distribution used in our experiments in Section 4.3.4.
Perhaps most important in practice is that for any considered candidate action, Algorithm
1 will terminate at a locally optimal point after at most O(n2 ) operations, which can be
proven formally by a simple counting argument. This guarantees that at any given system
state, our controller can do better than random guessing quickly, while not necessarily
guaranteeing that the optimal action will be found. Note that by no means is this the
only sort of algorithm which can be used here. Rather, this is the simplest approach which
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has been found to work well enough to be worth reporting here. It is expected that in
different application domains, researchers may want to investigate the efficacy of different
approaches. Those interested may want to read up on heuristic algorithms for integer
programming problems (see, e.g., [134, 135]).
4.3.4. Numerical Experiments
We simulate the evolution of the SEIV process under the EMPC defined in Section 4.1,
using the optimization method defined in Section 4.3.3 with decay rate r = 0.07 and
∆t = 0.375, where the candidate solutions for Algorithm 1 are chosen such that exposed
and infected nodes are quarantined independently with probability 0.7, and susceptible and
vigilant nodes are quarantined independently with probability 0.1. All numerical integrations are performed with Matlab’s implementation of ode45. We compare its performance
against that of the total quarantine base heuristic given in Section 4.3.2. Representative
results of our numerical study are given in Figure 6, which reports the result of a simulation
of a 200-node Erdös-Reyni random graph with connection probability 0.6, and spreading
parameters chosen as αi = 0.1, βij = 0.1, γij = 0.1, δi = 1.25, ηi = 3.5, and ξi = 2, where
the parameters are equivalued for all edges and nodes so as to be able to fully specify the
problem considered.
From the convergence plot given in Figure 6a, we see that while the approximations generated by the solutions of (3.6) are somewhat loose at the beginning of the simulation, they
are highly nontrivial by themselves. Moreover, the optimal upper-bound given by Theorem
3 improves the approximation further, decreasing the uncertainty of the approximation by
a few units in some cases. At their worst, the optimal bounds constrain the expectation
of the process to within an interval of approximately 20 nodes, corresponding to an uncertainty of approximately 10%, with respect to the number of nodes in the graph. While this
suggests that an ideal controller may be able to attain better performance, it also suggests
that possible improvements are limited. Moreover, as time passes, the quality of the approximation improves to the point where the upper- and lower- approximations converge,
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(a) Number of exposed and infected nodes.

(b) Cost savings.

Figure 6: Plots numerically evaluating the performance of the proposed controller. Figure
6a shows that the proposed controller induces exponential elimination of the epidemic.
Figure 6b demonstrates that the stochastic optimization method proposed in Algorithm 1
can significantly reduce the number of nodes required to be quarantine in order to guarantee
the desired elimination rate.
providing further evidence of the approximation method’s utility.
From the cost plot given in Figure 6b, we can see that the cost of the controller is substantially reduced, with respect to a comparison against the total quarantine base policy. To some
extent, this provides a mathematical validation of the opinions expressed by the medical
community, which suggest that quarantining individuals exposed to infectious diseases is
not always required for effective disease control [7]. Of course, the SEIV model we study
here is perhaps too simple to say anything more concrete. We leave generalization of the
framework we have presented here as a potential direction for future work.

4.4. Technical Arguments
In this section, we collect some additional detailed technical arguments necessary to justify
some claims made in the body of Chapter 4. Each subsection corresponds to one result
which had been referenced without proof in order to streamline the presentation of the
results in the main text.
4.4.1. Proof of Theorem 4
Our argument proceeds by demonstrating that the sequence of controls realized by the
proposed EMPC method induce the desired decay property. Principally, the proof relies
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on an induction, and an application of the tower property of conditional expectations [136,
Proposition 13.2.7].
We have by construction that the inequality
Euaux [M(X(t + ∆t))|X(t)] ≤ M(X(t))e−r∆t

(4.20)

holds. Since the optimization routine will only pass back solutions which satisfy the stability
constraint, as it will at worst pass back the action taken by the auxiliary policy, we have
that
Eumpc [M(X(t + ∆t))|X(t)] ≤ M(X(t))e−r∆t

(4.21)

holds as well. We use this in an induction to prove the inequality demanded by the theorem’s
statement. Take
Eumpc [M(X(∆t))|X(0)] ≤ M(X(0))e−r∆t

(4.22)

as a base for induction, and for an induction hypothesis that
Eumpc [M(X(k∆t))|X(0)] ≤ M(X(0))e−rk∆t

(4.23)

holds for some arbitrary positive integer k. We now show that this implies that
Eumpc [M(X((k + 1)∆t))|X(0)] ≤ M(X(0))e−r(k+1)∆t .

By expanding the conditioning in accordance with the tower property of conditional expectation [136, Proposition 13.2.7], we have that the identity

Eumpc [M(X((k + 1)∆t))|X(0)] = Eumpc [E[M(X((k + 1)∆t))|X(k∆t)]|X(0)]
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(4.24)

holds. From definition, we have the inequality
Eumpc [M(X((k + 1)∆t))|X(k∆t), X(0)] ≤ M(X(k∆t))e−r∆t ,

which when applied to the identify (4.24) gives

Eumpc [E[M(X((k + 1)∆t))|X(k∆t)]|X(0)] ≤ Eumpc [M(X(k∆t))|X(0)]e−r∆t .
Now, the induction hypothesis (4.23) yields the inequality
Eumpc [M(X((k + 1)∆t))|X(0)]e−r∆t ≤ M(X(0))e−r(k+1)∆t ,

which shows that (4.4) holds for any t ∈ T∆t . Noting that this final inequality is tight in
the case where (4.3) is tight at every sampling time completes the proof.



4.4.2. Proof of Theorem 6
The essence of this proof is in demonstrating that the total quarantine policy induces
sufficient negative drift in the process so as to guarantee the expectation decay stated
in the theorem’s hypothesis. To accomplish this, we analyze the evolution of the upperbounds on the compartmental membership probabilities for node i and compartments E
and I. Applying the approximation dynamics (3.2) for the SEIV moment dynamics (4.14)
with βij and γij set to 0 for all j, we have that the linear system
E
x̄˙ E
i = −δi x̄i ,

(4.25)

I
x̄˙ Ii = δi x̄E
i − ηi x̄i ,

describes the behavior of the approximating system under the total quarantine policy. Using
standard solution techniques from the theory of linear ordinary differential equations to solve
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(4.25) with initial conditions x̄E (t) and x̄I (t) and ηi , δi distinct gives the solutions:
I
−ηi ∆t
x̄Ii (t + ∆t) + x̄E
+
i (t + ∆t) = x̄i (t)e

δi
ηi
−δi ∆t
x̄E
−
x̄E (t)e−ηi ∆t .
i (t)e
ηi − δi
ηi − δ i i

Because we observe the state X(t) at each sampling time t ∈ T∆t , we have only two possible
I
E
I
initial conditions for each i : x̄E
i (t) = 1 and x̄i (t) = 0 or x̄i (t) = 0 and x̄i (t) = 1.

In the first case, we need to verify that there exists some r > 0 and ∆t which satisfy the
decay constraint
ηi
δi
e−δi ∆t −
e−ηi ∆t ≤ e−r∆t .
ηi − δi
ηi − δ i

(4.26)

By assuming ηi > δi > r rearranging terms, approximating the resulting inequality, and
taking logarithms, we get
ln(ηi ) − ln(ηi − δi )
≤ ∆t.
δi − r

(4.27)

Similarly, by assuming δi > ηi > r, we get the inequality
ln(δi ) − ln(δi − ηi )
≤ ∆t.
ηi − r

(4.28)

Considering both inequalities together verifies that the inequality stated by the theorem’s
hypothesis, i.e.
ln(max{ηi , δi }) − ln(|ηi − δi |)
≤ ∆t
min{ηi , δi } − r

(4.29)

I
suffices to demonstrate that when (4.25) is initialized with x̄E
i (t) = 0 and x̄i (t) = 1, we
I
satisfy the desired exponential decay inequality. In the case where x̄E
i (t) = 1 and x̄i (t) = 0,

we have that the exponential decay inequality is satisfied for any t, and all r < ηi , which is
implied by the inequality claimed by the hypothesis.
Recollecting our argument, we see that for r and ∆t satisfying (4.29), we have the decay
inequality
I
E
I
−r∆t
x̄E
.
i (t + ∆t) + x̄i (t + ∆t) ≤ (x̄i (t) + x̄i (t))e
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By summing over all of the nodes in the network, we get
n
X

n
X

I
x̄E
i (t + ∆t) + x̄i (t + ∆t) ≤

i=1

which since M(X(t)) =

!
−r∆t
x̄Ii (t) + x̄E
i (t) e

i=1

Pn

I
i=1 x̄i (t)


+ x̄E
i (t) and

E[M(X(t + ∆t))|X(t)] ≤

n
X

!
x̄Ii (t + ∆t) + x̄E
i (t + ∆t)

i=1

hold, together imply
Eutot [M(X(t + ∆t))|X(t)] ≤ M(X(t))e−r∆t

which was sought. This concludes the proof.
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CHAPTER 5 : Discrete-time Epidemics: Concepts and Notation
In Chapter 4, we developed a predictive controller which guarantees a strong notion of
stability on the continuous-time epidemic process (2.1). However, its implementation is
difficult. This leads us to wonder if efficient controllers can be developed for epidemic
process in any context. Upon reflection, one may note that the majority of our difficulty in
implementing the controller detailed in Chapter 4 comes from two features: the difficulty of
making accurate predictions quickly, and the lack of structure present in the optimization
problem characterizing the controller. We will see in Chapters 6 and 7 that these challenges
can be addressed by changing focus to discrete-time epidemics, and considering problems
in which enforcing a strict notion of stability is not necessary. Presently, we develop the
concepts and notation required to understand discrete-time epidemics.
Discrete-time epidemics retain the same qualitative features that authors use to motivate
the study of continuous-time epidemics. Behavior exhibited by one agent influences the
behavior of closely associated agents, by way of stochastic contact and adoption. The
primary distinction between these two paradigms is technical. In continuous-time epidemics,
events which cause transitions to occur may happen at any time on the real line. In discretetime epidemics, we only track whether or not transition events occur over fixed intervals of
time, and transitions are applied only when time increments.
Since in any likely application, it seems that interaction with the process will not occur
continuously, this change is not likely a significant limitation. Indeed, we should note that
the method developed in Chapter 4 only interacts with the process through observations
made and control actions applied at regular, discrete intervals. Accommodating this change
of abstraction requires some technical changes to how the process is defined mathematically.
We detail the general manner in which discrete-time epidemics are defined here briefly,
before continuing on to develop controllers for two different applications of discrete-time
epidemics in Chapters 6 and 7.
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As is the case with continuous-time epidemics (formally developed in Chapter 2), a node’s
status is formally defined by membership in one in a set of m compartments L. Membership in a particular compartment ` ∈ L is denoted by using a collection of 0/1 indicator
random variables Xi` , which take the value 1 if node i is in compartment `, and 0 otherwise.
Since each node i belongs to one and only one compartment at all times, we have that
P
`
`∈L Xi = 1 for all states X in the process’ state space X . Since each node may reside in
any compartment, it is straightforward to note that X contains mn elements, each defining
one compartmental membership combination.
Where discrete-time epidemics differ from continuous-time epidemics is the manner in which
the compartmental memberships of each node transition. Recall that for continuous-time
epidemics, compartmental membership transitions occur due to the occurrence of transition
events which are defined as independent Poisson processes (see Chapter 2). In discretetime epidemics, transition events are characterized by functions of independent Bernoulli
processes. That is, we have
Xi`+ =

X

0

0

` →`
`
Zi(X;Y
) Xi ,

(5.1)

`0 ∈L
0

` →` is a function of the process state X, and a set of Bernoulli random variables Y,
where Zi(X;Y
)
P
`0 →` = 1 for all combinations of states X ∈ X , and compartments
which satisfies `∈L Zi(X;Y
)

`0 ∈ L. Note that across time, we assume each Y is independent, however the components
of Y may themselves be correlated if appropriate in context (e.g. modeling the indication
of a transition in a Markov chain). Note also that while the constraint on Z may seem
limiting, it is not particularly so.
For example, if we are concerned with modeling the spread of disease, we may want to
consider an agent to be infected if it comes into contact with an infected agent at any point
during the interval of time under consideration. This situation would call for a discrete-time
SIS process, where the S compartment indicates that an agent is healthy (or susceptible
to infection), and the I compartment indicates that an agent is infected. Allowing the
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Bernoulli random variables Y to indicate such a contact, we may write

S→I
Zi(X;Y
) ,1−

Y

(1 − XjI YjI ),

(5.2)

j∈Ni

and
S→S
Zi(X;Y
) ,

Y

(1 − XjI YjI ),

(5.3)

j∈Ni

where Ni is the set of all neighbors of node i, i.e. all agents which may spread infection
S→S + Z S→I
to node i with positive probability. This definition of Z satisfies Zi(X;Y
)
i(X;Y ) = 1,

as desired. Moreover, the qualitative interpretation of this function is the same as the
S → I transition process for the continuous-time SIS model. Infections are spread to
susceptible nodes due to contact with infectious agents, where contacts are modeled as
random processes. All we have lost in this change of abstraction is detailed information
regarding the timing of transition events. But, since this data is likely not observable in
many applications, it is not a significant loss.
We study the control of two different types of discrete-time epidemics in Chapters 6 and 7.
To accommodate this, we alter the function Z to accept an argument detailing the applied
control action a, which we generally take to take value in a finite, discrete set A. We then
P
`0 →`
0
enforce that `∈L Zi(X,a;Y
) = 1 holds for all combinations of X ∈ X , a ∈ A, and ` ∈ L. As
in the uncontrolled process detailed above, this restriction is slight. We demonstrate this
by considering the control of model of biological disease by providing protective resources
(Chapter 6), and the control of a model for a malware epidemic (Chapter 7). In both cases,
the use of a discrete-time epidemic model helps us develop useful controllers.
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CHAPTER 6 : Containing SIS Epidemics via Submodular Minimization
In this chapter, we detail a predictive control method designed to limit the harm caused
by a biological epidemic modeled by a generalized discrete-time SIS process. The process
model we study is a particular discrete-time epidemic process, as defined in Chapter 5. The
problem we study is of the same form of as problems commonly studied in previous efforts
considering the mitigation of biological diseases. More precisely, previous works studying
optimal control of epidemics (e.g., [15–30] and references therein) often do so by posing a
problem of the form
min Eπ [
π∈Π

∞
X

J(X(τ ), θ(τ ))|X = X(0)],

(6.1)

τ =0

where Π is the set of all non-anticipating control policies which map observations of the
process as it evolves to changes in the spreading model’s parameters θ, and set

J(X, θ) , µc(θ) + (1 − µ)q(I(X))

(6.2)

where c(θ) is the instantaneous economic cost of setting the processes parameters to θ,
I(X) is a function which maps the state X to the number of infected nodes in state X, and
q is some non-negative function which imposes a soft cost on the persistence of infection.
However, the technical difficulty of such an approach limits its applicability to mean-field
models of homogeneous processes, and yields only structural results (e.g. that there exists
an optimal policy with a particular threshold structure [15–19, 21–30]).
Here, we show that by modeling the disease spread with a discrete-time ground-truth model,
and defining the cost associated to the epidemics’ persistence in the network in a particular
manner, we can efficiently solve a particular infinite-horizon optimal control problem in a
receding horizon manner to generate appropriate control actions. Since the epidemic model
and objective function posited capture the same qualitative features used to motivate the
problems studied in previous works, this change does not sacrifice much. Moreover, since
the collective effect of our modeling choices allows the associated optimal control problem
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to be solved in polynomial time, it enables an efficient implementation even in the presence
of significant heterogeneities. This provides an advance over the prior works in the area.
It should be noted that the much of the material presented in the body of this chapter is
adapted from a recent paper which is to be published in IEEE Control Systems Letters’
special issue on control and network theory for biological systems [137], and its attendant
supplementary material. Some elements of the presentation and language have been amended to make the contents consistent with the rest of the dissertation. Additionally, a result
demonstrating that the objective function of the optimal control problem studied can be
encoded as a cut capacity function has been included (Proposition 2). This result allows
optimization methods for minimum cut capacity problems to be used to implement the
controller, significantly improving the method’s complexity.
Organization

The developments of this chapter proceed in three stages. First, we specify

the particular model and problem under study (Section 6.1). Then, we provide some analysis
which demonstrates that the problem can be solved efficiently numerically (Section 6.2).
Finally, we study a numerical example in detail (Section 6.3). As has been the case in
other chapters, detailed technical arguments which do not add significant value to the main
discussion have been placed at the end of the chapter (Section 6.5).

•

6.1. Model and Problem Statement
In this section, we formally detail the epidemic process we study (Section 6.1.1), the means
of control we use (Section 6.1.2), and the problem we consider (Section 6.1.3).
6.1.1. Generalized Discrete-time SIS Model
We study an epidemic spreading process on an n node graph G, with node set V, and edge
set E. The process we study has one susceptible (i.e. healthy) compartment (denoted by
S), and p infected spreading compartments (denoted by {Ik }k∈[p] ), where the multiplicity
of infected compartments allows us to model different stages of infection (e.g. differing
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severity of symptoms). As detailed in Chapter 5, we denote by Xi` (t) an indicator random
variable which takes the value 1 if node i is in compartment ` at time t, and takes the value
0 otherwise. We denote the state space by X .
A node i transitions from susceptible to the first infected compartment (i.e. I1 ) on the
increment from time t to time t + 1 through contact with nodes which are in an infected
compartment at time t. Conditioned on such a contact occurring, we assume this transition
happens with probability one. As can be understood after parsing the later details of
our analysis, this assumption is only made for simplicity. For example, the case in which
infection occurs only with positive probability in the event of contact can be considered
without changing any significant details. Given that a node i is infected at time t, it
transitions to other model compartments independently of all external phenomena. That
is, the healing process is unaffected by external contacts with infectious agents.
Mathematically, we have that the indicator XiS evolves as
XiS+

=

XiS (1

−

S→I1
Zi(X;Y
))

+

p
X

Ik →S
XiIk Zi(Y
) ,

(6.3)

k=1

where the Z functions determine the transition events which occur, and the vector of independent Bernoulli random variables Y denote the underlying Bernoulli processes which drive
Ik →S
compartmental transitions (as detailed in Chapter 5), where the terms Zi(Y
) are random

variables determining internal transitions from compartment Ik , and so are correlated with
Ik →`
S→I1
the terms Zi(Y
) (defined after equation (6.6)). In particular, Zi(X;Y ) determines whether

or not an event which would cause node i to become infected if currently susceptible, and
is defined as
S→I1
Zi(X;Y
) , min{1,

X
j∈Ni

YijS→I

p
X

XjIk },

(6.4)

k=1

where the random variables YijS→I model contacts between nodes i and j.
S→I1
One can see that this definition of Zi(X;Y
) captures the desired qualitative behavior: if at
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least one infected neighbor of i comes into contact with i, then node i becomes infected (i.e.
Ik →S
S→I1
Zi(X;Y
) = 1). The random variables Zi(X;Y ) are indicators denoting a transition from the

k’th infected compartment to susceptibility, and are defined as
Ik →S
Ik →S
Zi(Y
,
) , Yi

(6.5)

with each YiIk →S being an independent Bernoulli random variable with known distribution
(equivalently, probability of taking the value one). Note that this particular function does
not depend on X; these transitions only occur due to effects internal to the node, and so
are unaffected by the compartmental memberships of external nodes.
Similarly, we have that the indicator XiI1 evolves as
XiI1 +

=

S→I1
XiS Zi(X;Y
)

+

p
X

Ik →I1
XiIk Zi(Y
− XiI1
)

k=1

X

I1 →`
Zi(Y
) ,

(6.6)

`∈L

Ik →I1
where the functions Zi(Y
are random variables determining the transitions from infection
)

compartment Ik to infection compartment I1 and so are defined as the transition Bernoulli
Ik →I1
I1 →`
I1 →`
variables themselves, i.e. Zi(Y
, YiIk →I1 , and the function Zi(Y
)
) is defined as Zi(Y ) ,

YiI1 →` . Finally, the indicators XiIk for k 6= 1 evolve as
XiIk + =

X

`→Ik
Ik
Xi` Zi(Y
) − Xi

X

Ik →`
Zi(Y
) ,

(6.7)

`∈L

`∈L\{S}

where the Z functions are defined analogously to those used for I1 ’s indicator.
Note that the model presented here allows us to model the amount of time taken to recover
from an infection with more precision than a standard discrete-time SIS epidemic, in which
I1 →S
there is only one infected compartment, and Zi(Y
) is an independent Bernoulli random

variable at all times. This forces the time taken to recover to be distributed as a geometric
random variable. Under the model specified here, the time taken to recover follows a discrete
phase-type distribution, and so can be chosen quite generally [138]. This feature helps us in
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the example we consider in Section 6.3, as the amount of time which is required to recover
from the considered disease is usually 7−10 days, and we choose the structure of our process
to make this healing time uniformly distributed on this set.
6.1.2. Actuation Model
We consider allocating protective barriers in order to prevent the spread of an infection.
Formally, our controller actuates the process detailed in Section 6.1.1 by selecting a subset
of nodes P to protect against infection. Because protective devices (e.g. latex gowns, gloves,
condoms) are often single-use, it is appropriate to model the economic cost of protecting
the set of nodes P as being the sum of edge weights, over all edges in which one adjacent
node is a susceptible node that is protected, and the other adjacent node is infected. That
is, we only pay to protect a particular node if it interacts with an infected person, and we
pay in proportion to the extent of interaction between the protected node and its infected
neighbors over the discretized time period (i.e. the total number of interactions which could
result in disease spread). Mathematically, we may express such a cost as
X

C(P|X) ,

X

1{i∈P}

cij ,

(6.8)

j∈Ni ∩VI (X)

i∈VS (X)

where 1{} is a {0, 1} indicator function, the non-negative constants cij model the cost
of providing a protective barrier for all interactions between i and j over one time period,
VS (X) denotes the set of susceptible nodes at state X, and VI (X) denotes the set of infected
nodes at state X. We model protecting a node by removing it from the graph. That is, a
node i which is in the set of protected nodes P and is susceptible at time t is susceptible at
time t + 1 with probability one. We have that the controlled dynamics for XiS follow
XiS+

=

XiS (1

−

S→I1
1{i∈P}
/ Zi(X) )

+

p
X

XiIk ZiIk →S ,

(6.9)

k=1

where the indicator 1{i∈P}
allows us to capture the effect that protected nodes never come
/
into contact with infected nodes (in a way which permits disease spread). The controlled
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dynamics for XiI1 are changed similarly. That is,
S→I1
XiI1 + = XiS 1{i∈P}
/ Zi(X;Y ) +

p
X

Ik →I1
XiIk Zi(Y
− XiI1
)

k=1

X

I1 →`
Zi(Y
) .

(6.10)

`∈L

As providing agents with protective resources does not affect their internal transition process, the dynamics for XiIk with k 6= 1 remain unchanged from (6.7).
6.1.3. Problem Statement
If we were strictly concerned with minimizing the total accumulated cost for our controller,
it is feasible to take the action P = ∅ at all times. Doing so incurs zero cost. However, this
may result in the infection persisting in the population for a long time. This is a socially
undesirable outcome. In general, we may wish to consider the presence of infection as a
sort of soft cost imposed on the controller, as has been done in previous works [17–19, 30]
for different process and actuation models, to varying levels of tractability.
In our case, if it were so that the process {X(t)} was a Markov chain on a small state space
and the set of possible control actions were small, (6.1) could be solved by treating it as a
Markov decision process and applying a standard solution technique, e.g. value iteration.
However, in the case of the generalized SIS process proposed in Section 6.1.1, the state
space has (1 + p)n states. Moreover, there are 2n possible choices for the set of protected
nodes P. As such, it is an interesting task to construct a controller which allows for the
same qualitative tradeoff as the approaches which address problems of the form (6.1), but
is computationally tractable to implement.
To accomplish this, we consider applying controls which solve the problem

min µC(P|X) + (1 − µ)Q(P|X)

P⊆V

(6.11)

where C(P|X) is the cost function (6.8), and Q(P|X) is the cost of applying the rollout
policy which protects all susceptible nodes for all future times, given that the set of nodes
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P is protected at the current time (see, e.g., [139, Section 6.4] for background on the use of
rollout policies in infinite horizon optimal control). Because the rollout policy only incurs
a cost when exactly one node adjacent to an edge is susceptible, we have by definition that

Q(P|X) , EΘ(P) [

∞ X
X

(XiS (τ ) ⊕ XjS (τ ))cij |X(0) = X],

(6.12)

τ =1 {i,j}∈E

where Θ(P) is the measure induced by protecting the set of nodes P at the current time,
and by ⊕ we denote the exclusive or operator, i.e. for two variables a, b ∈ {0, 1},

a⊕b,





0,







1,



1,







0,

a = 0, b = 0;
a = 1, b = 0;
(6.13)
a = 0, b = 1;
a = 1, b = 1.

Intuitively, the funciton Q plays the same roll in (6.11) as the function q(I) plays in (6.1).
It penalizes the existence of infection in the network, and so allows a control designer a
means for trading off between an immediate resource expenditure, and the rate of decay
in the population of infected individuals, by appropriately selecting µ. However, it is not
immediately clear that actions can be computed as in (6.11), as the set over which the
optimum must be computed has 2n elements. That is a naı̈ve , brute-force approach would
have exponential complexity. We demonstrate in Section 6.2 that a better algorithmic
approach can be taken, leveraging results from submodular optimization.

6.2. An Efficient Algorithmic Approach to Containing Discrete-time SIS Processes
In this section, we develop the mathematical foundations required to efficiently implement
a controller as described in Section 6.1. Section 6.2.1 provides some technical preliminaries
which are needed in our analysis. Section 6.2.2 demonstrates that the optimization problem
(6.11) has sufficient structure so as to allow for the use of efficient optimization algorithms,
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and provides some references to software packages that can be used to solve problem.
6.2.1. Mathematical Preliminaries
The key mathematical concept which allows for the efficient solution of (6.11) is submodularity. Submodularity is a mathematical formalization of the concept of diminishing returns:
adding an object to a larger set has less of an impact than adding the same object to a
smaller set. Formally, a submodular function satisfies the following definition.
Definition 4 (Submodular Functions) Let Ω be a finite ground set of objects, and
suppose f : 2Ω → R, where 2Ω denotes the power set of Ω, i.e. the set of all subsets of Ω.
The function f is said to be submodular if and only if

f (Z ∪ {z}) − f (Z) ≤ f (Y ∪ {z}) − f (Y )

(6.14)

holds for all Y ⊂ Z ⊆ Ω, and z ∈ Ω \ Z.

•

It is frequently the case that the submodularity of a complicated function is verified by
reducing the proof to checking the submodularity of a simpler function. We use such an
argument later (Section 6.2.2), using the exclusive-or function as the simple function, which
is submodular:
Lemma 3 (Submodularity of Restricted Exclusive Or) Let Ω be a finite ground set,
take a, b ∈ Ω, A, B ∈ {0, 1}, and let ⊕ denote operator defined by (6.13). The function

f (W ) = A1{a∈W
/ } ⊕ B1{b∈W
/ },

is submodular.
Proof : See Section 6.5.1
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6.2.2. Efficiently Computing Optimal Sets of Protected Nodes
A principal reason that submodularity is an important concept is that it allows for a variety
of combinatorial optimization problems to be solved (or approximately solved) in polynomial
time. In this subsection, we demonstrate that (6.11) is one such problem. As it is well-known
that the minimum of a submodular function over a finite ground set can be computed in time
which grows polynomially with respect to the size of the ground set (see, e.g., [140, 141]),
it suffices for us to demonstrate that the objective of (6.11) is a submodular function. We
accomplish this in the following result:
Theorem 7 (Submodularity of Objective Function) Fix a particular generalized SIS
process (as detailed in Section 6.1.1), a number µ ∈ [0, 1], and a state X. Let C be defined
as in (6.8), and Q as in (6.12). Then, the function

hX (P) , µC(P|X) + (1 − µ)Q(P|X)

is a submodular set function, where the ground set is taken to be the set of susceptible
nodes at state X, denoted VS (X).
Proof : Since a function defined by a non-negative weighted sum of submodular functions
is itself a submodular function, it suffices to show that C and Q are both submodular
functions. We handle each separately.
Submodularity of C

Because the constants cij are non-negative, it suffices to note that

indicators of the form f (W ) = 1{r∈W } are submodular. This is straightforward: if x ∈ Ω\W,
then f (W ∪ {x}) − f (W ) = 1 when x = r, and 0 otherwise, regardless of the choice of W.
This implies that (6.14) is met with equality, satisfying Definition 4.
Submodularity of Q

Since the generalized SIS process defined in Section 6.1.1 is defi-

ned on a finite state space in finite time, we may construct a finite sample space for it. Call
this sample space Ξ. Because having exactly one node in a pair of nodes i and j be suscep-
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tible is equivalent to having exactly one node in a pair of nodes belong to some infected
compartment, we have
∞ X
X
Q(P|X) = EΘ(P) [
(XiI (τ ) ⊕ XjI (τ ))cij |X],
τ =1 {i,j}∈E

=

∞
XX

X

(XiI (τ ; P, ξ) ⊕ XjI (τ ; P, ξ))cij Pr(ξ|X),

ξ∈Ξ τ =1 {i,j}∈E

where we denote the dependence on the choice of protected nodes and the underlying
sample ξ explicitly, use the notation Pr(ξ|X) for the probability that the sample ξ is drawn
from Ξ, given that the process is currently in state X, and define the shorthand notation
P
XjI = pk=1 XiIk . Since the terms cij and Pr(ξ|X) are nonnegative, it suffices to show that
the terms (XiI (τ ; P, ξ) ⊕ XjI (τ ; P, ξ)) are submodular functions.
Because the rollout policy removes all susceptible nodes which are adjacent to an infected
node, we have that all nodes which are infected at some time τ ≥ t+1 were either infected at
time t, or became infected on the transition from time t to time t + 1. In the case where the
node i was infected at time t, the definition of the process has that all indicators Xi` (τ ; P, ξ)
are independent of the choice P, and are determined only by the particular choice of ξ. In
particular, we have that

XiI (τ ; P, ξ)

=




1

XiI = 1;

{τ ≤Hi (ξ,Xi (t))} ,



1{i∈P}
/ 1{∨j∈N

Y (ξ)XjI }
i ij

1{τ ≤Hi (ξ,Xi (t+1)} ,

XiS = 1,

where Hi (ξ, Xi (t)) is a random variable denoting the next time at which an event which
transitions the node i from infected to susceptible happens, given that the node is in its
current compartment, and ∨ denotes the logical or operation, used here because all infection
events have the same effect on an unprotected susceptible node.
Note that in the case that XiI = 1, submodularity follows immediately from noting that
XiI (τ ; P, ξ) is unaffected by the choice P. In the case that XiS = 1, we have XiI (τ ; P, ξ) is
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the indicator 1{i∈P}
multiplied by a constant in {0, 1}, which is determined by ξ. It follows
/
that Q(P|X) is a non-negative weighted sum of functions of the form

f (P) = A1{a∈P}
⊕ B1{b∈P}
/
/ ,

with A, B ∈ {0, 1}, which are submodular by Lemma 3. This completes the proof.



The submodularity property proven in Theorem 7 allows us to use a variety of polynomialtime algorithms to solve (6.11) [140, 142]. However, using these general-purpose algorithms
would only be well advised if there were no further structure present in the problem. We
have presented this as central result here because it is likely that similar arguments can
be used in other contexts to attain similar results, where further refinements may not be
possible. Here, we can do better.
In particular, we can demonstrate that (6.11) can be written as a problem of finding the
minimum capacity cut in a weighted graph. This is a corollary to the following
Proposition 2 (Structure of Cut Capacity Functions) Consider the function

f (W ) =

X

αi 1{i∈W } +

i∈[n]

X

βij (1{i∈W } ⊕ 1{j∈W } ) +

i∈[n],j∈[n]

X

γi 1{i∈W
/ },

(6.15)

i∈[n]

where the chosen constants αi , βij , and γi are nonnegative.
Every such function can be represented as a cut capacity with respect to a graph with n + 2
nodes. Likewise, all cut capacity functions defined with respect to a graph with n + 2 nodes
can be written as (6.15).
Proof : See Section 6.5.2.



Proposition 2 demonstrates that all functions which are nonnegative weighted sums of
exclusive-or functions and indicators can be written as cut capacities of weighted graphs.
This being the case, we can encode (6.11) as a cut capacity minimization problem, as the
economic cost is a weighted sum of indicators that particular nodes are protected, and the
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tail cost is a weighed sum of exclusive-or operations, and indicators that nodes are not
protected, i.e. of the form (6.15).
This is important, as such problems are less complex to solve than general submodular
function minimization problems. While sharp results concerning either problem are not
yet known, there exists an O(n3 ) algorithm for solving mincut problems (the preflow-push
algorithm) [143], while the best-known general submodular function minimization algorithm
is O(n3 log2 T +n4 logO(1) n), where T is the time required to evaluate the objective function
[144]. Moreover, since the objective function of (6.11) can be an arbitrary nonnegative
weighted sum of exclusive-or functions, and Proposition 2 gives that the class of nonnegative
weighted sums of exclusive-or functions and graph capacities are equivalent, solving (6.11)
with current best-known algorithms for mincut is the best that can be done. This is what we
have done in the simulations given in Section 6.3. We close this section by providing some
brief technical remarks regarding extensions to and aspects of the results just presented.
Remark 1 (Cost Constrained Control) Instead of minimizing the cost of control actions
under the assumption that any set of nodes can be removed from the graph at all times if
so desired, one may find it useful to be able to place hard constraints on the cost incurred
by the controller. For instance, suppose that the controller is applied in the context where
it is being used to optimally distribute protective devices in order to stem the growth of a
sexually transmitted infection, and only a limited number C of devices is available at the
time the decision must be made. One can design a controller for this situation be applying
actions designed by solutions to the optimization problem

min {Q(P|X) | C(P|X) ≤ C}.

P⊆V

(6.16)

However, it is known that constrained submodular minimization is N P-hard [145], and
so (6.16) can only be solved approximately. While there are myriad works which focus on
solving problems with similar structures (see, e.g., [145]), we have insufficient space to adapt
and extend their results to our setting here. We leave this as a task for future work.
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(a) Number of infected nodes as a function of time

(b) Stage cost savings

Figure 7: A study of the controller performance at µ = 0.825. Figure (10a) demonstrates
that the controller eliminates the epidemic from the network quickly, despite its aggressive
decisions. Figure (10b) shows that the controller chooses actions with considerable cost
savings when compared against protecting all susceptible nodes. The lightest shaded region
contains 98% of the 100 samples generated; the darker shaded region contains 80% of the
100 samples generated. The dark central line is the sample expectation.
Remark 2 (Effect of Tuning) Selecting µ appropriately is important. For small values
of µ, the objective of (6.11) is dominated by the effect of Q(P|X). In the extreme case
where µ = 0, the controller will take actions explicitly to minimize the tail cost. For large
values of µ, the objective of (6.11) is dominated by the effect of C(P|X). In the extreme
case where µ = 1, it is simple to show that the optimal action will be to protect no nodes,
under any circumstance. Intuitively, intermediate values of µ balance the immediate cost
of resource expenditure against its long-term consequences. This is seen in Figure 8.

•

6.3. An Example Problem: Simulations and Implementation Details
We consider a graph with 200 nodes. We assume that for each i, j ∈ V such that i 6= j, the
edge {i, j} is in the set of edges E independently with probability 0.01. We assume that an
unprotected contact between two nodes results in an infection spreading from the infected
node to the susceptible node with a probability randomly generated from the unit interval.
We assume that nodes come into contact with each other a maximum of three times per
day, and so edge costs take values in the set {0, 1, 2, 3}, where the value 0 is taken if the
edge {i, j} ∈
/ E, and the other values are chosen uniformly at random if {i, j} ∈ E. Because
treatments for sexually transmitted infections (e.g. chlamydia) often take in excess of a
week to be effective [146], the Markov chain used to model the infectious compartments
was chosen so as to make the distribution of times from infection to susceptibility uniformly
distributed on the set {7, 8, 9, 10}.
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Primarily, we are concerned with three features of the controller’s performance: the time
the controller takes to drive the epidemic to an infection-free state, the total amount of
resources spent throughout the duration of the epidemic, and the rate at which control
resources are spent by the controller. These are likely to be principle factors in determining
whether a controller is fit for use in a particular context. In some cases, we may care about
driving the epidemic to extinction as quickly as possible. In others, we may care about the
economic cost of implementing the control, as we may have to justify the expense. In still
others, we may care about the rate of resource use, as we have to formulate appropriate
supply chains to implement the controller.
Figure 8 studies the effect of varying µ on the implemented controller’s attained elimination
time, and total resource cost. Note that each simulation was capped to last at most 200
days. One can notice that the effect on elimination time appears to be monotonic, while the
effect on total resource cost appears to be unimodal. This is easy to understand. For large
values of µ, the controller prioritizes limiting the resource usage rate over all else. In the
limit of µ = 1, no control action will be applied. Thus, the epidemic will go uncontrolled,
and will persist for a long time. However, the economic cost of this plan is zero. Conversely,
for small values of µ, the potential future cost of containing the epidemic is prioritized. In
the limit of µ = 0, the controller takes actions which minimize the total resources expended
while guaranteeing that no further people become infected. As such, we should expect
that the epidemic ends quickly while using relatively few resources in sum, but while using
resources at a higher rate. We support these intuitions more concretely by considering the
controller’s behavior for a few separate values of µ.
Figure 9 presents the controller’s performance at µ = 0.86; Figure 10 presents the controller’s
performance at µ = 0.85; Figure 11 presents the controller’s performance at µ = 0.80. Note
that to study the rate of resource usage of the controller, we plot the cost saving as compared
against the cost of protecting all susceptible nodes in the graph. This normalizes for infection
level at the process’ current state, and allows us to make more precise comparisons against
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(a) The elimination time of the controller

(b) The total cost incurred

Figure 8: A study of varying the tuning parameter µ. The lightest shaded region contains
98% of the 100 samples generated; the darker shaded region contains 80% of the 100 samples
generated. The dark central line is the sample expectation.

(a) Number of infected nodes as a function of time

(b) Stage cost savings

Figure 9: A study of the controller performance at µ = 0.86. The lightest shaded region
contains 98% of the 100 samples generated; the darker shaded region contains 80% of the
100 samples generated. The dark central line is the sample expectation.
different controllers. From studying these figures collectively, we can see that the elimination
time of the epidemic is smallest for µ = 0.8, but its resource rate usage is greatest. Likewise,
we see that for µ = 0.86, the epidemic’s elimination time is largest amongst the parameters
studied, but its resource usage rate is the least. For µ = 0.85, intermediate behavior is
realized.

(a) Number of infected nodes as a function of time.

(b) Stage cost savings

Figure 10: A study of the controller performance at µ = 0.85. The lightest shaded region
contains 98% of the 100 samples generated; the darker shaded region contains 80% of the
100 samples generated. The dark central line is the sample expectation.
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(a) Number of infected nodes

(b) Stage cost savings

Figure 11: A study of the controller performance at µ = 0.80. The lightest shaded region
contains 98% of the 100 samples generated; the darker shaded region contains 80% of the
100 samples generated. The dark central line is the sample expectation.

6.3.1. Simulations with Imperfect State Information
In this section, we consider the behavior of the proposed controller when it is forced to
act with imperfect state information. That is, we assume the controller’s observations of
the state are noisy. As a particular model of uncertainty, we consider the case in which all
agents are assessed for infection with an imperfect test such that nodes that are judged to be
healthy (i.e. in the susceptible compartment) are actually healthy with some probability λ,
and are in the first state of infection with probability (1 − λ). All classifications are assumed
to be independent of each other. This situation may arise in practice when symptoms are
subtle at the onset.
Note that λ is a parameter which determines how much uncertainty there is in the state
observation. For λ = 1, the observations are perfect. For λ = 0.5, the controller has no
information about the state of nodes observed to be infected, as it is equally likely that
each node is susceptible or infected. Note that 0.5 is the worst case possible, as if our
observer classified nodes incorrectly at a greater rate, we can construct a better observer by
inverting the reported observations. From this, one would expect that for values of λ near
1, the controller performs well, but as λ approaches 0.5, performance degrades significantly.
Note that in this particular case, the observation model is sufficiently simple so as to be
able to incorporate the cost of the observer’s analytically, i.e. no sampling is required to
implement the controller.
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(b) Total cost incurred

(a) Elimination time of the process

Figure 12: A study of the effect of the parameter λ, as detailed in Section 6.3.1. The lightest
shaded region contains 98% of the 100 samples generated; the darker shaded region contains
80% of the 100 samples generated. The dark central line is the sample expectation.
Figure 12 studies the effect of varying λ, where the model’s parameters are the same as
before. The tuning parameter µ = 0.85 was used, as this was shown earlier to be a value
which produces moderate controller performance in all aspects when state observations are
perfect. One can see from examining this figure that the inclusion of additional uncertainly
gradually causes performance to decay. This is to be expected.
Importantly, however, one can observe that the controller performs quite well until a substantial amount of state uncertainty is introduced. To see this in more detail, consider
Figure 13, which studies the performance of the controller in detail, where µ = 0.85, and
λ = 0.9. Comparing against Figure 10, we see that while the convergence of the epidemic is
slowed somewhat, the drop in performance is not drastic. The controller still takes actions
which are significantly more cost-effective than protecting all nodes at all times.
This is encouraging, as it suggests the process of tuning the controller is robust to different
state observation models. Of course, if one has access to the observation model which will
be used in practice, one can further tune the controller to attain performance. This is seen
in Figure 14, where we have repeated the simulation used to generate Figure 13, except
with µ = 0.84 to prioritize the tail cost somewhat more. One can see by inspection that
substantially faster convergence is attained, at a cost of somewhat more expensive control
actions being applied at every stage.
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(a) Number of infected nodes

(b) Stage cost savings

Figure 13: A study of the controller performance at µ = 0.85, where uncertainty is incorporated into the system’s observations in the manner detailed in Section 6.3.1 with parameter
λ = 0.90. The lightest shaded region contains 98% of the 100 samples generated; the darker
shaded region contains 80% of the 100 samples generated. The dark central line is the
sample expectation.

(b) Stage cost savings

(a) Number of infected nodes

Figure 14: A study of the controller performance at µ = 0.84, where uncertainty is incorporated into the system’s observations in the manner detailed in Section 6.3.1 with parameter
λ = 0.90. The lightest shaded region contains 98% of the 100 samples generated; the darker
shaded region contains 80% of the 100 samples generated. The dark central line is the
sample expectation.
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6.3.2. Simulations with a Partially Unknown Spreading Graph
In this section, we study the controller’s performance in the event that the spreading graph
is not fully known. We consider one particular way to incorporate spreading graph uncertainty here which seems relevant to practice. We assume that the likelihood that infection
is spread from one infected agent to one susceptible for any given interaction is known deterministically, but whether two agents interact in a manner capable of spreading infection
is only known up to a distribution. This is relevant in the case of sexually transmitted
infections, as one can estimate the likelihood that infection is spread given sexual contact
between agents occurs separately from estimating the likelihood that any two individuals
have such contact.
We expect that more precise knowledge of the spreading graph can allow the controller
to take more precise actions. To study this more concretely, we assume that interactions
between nodes spread infection with probability 0.5. To model interactions in a way which we
can parameterize for our study, we generate a random graph of 200 nodes, with connection
probability 0.01. For some specified number ν ∈ [0.5, 1], we assume an interaction occurs
with probability ν if an edge is present in the graph, and probability (1 − ν) otherwise. All
interactions are assumed independent.
The behavior of the controller with µ = 0.8, and ν ranging from 0.5 to 1 is given in Figure 15.
As can be seen by examining the figure, the controller is forced into taking more aggressive
control actions when the graph is less certain (i.e. for small values of ν), spending resources
more aggressively, but attaining good convergence behavior. As ν tends to 1, the controller’s
actions become more precise. In this regime, the controller limits resource usage by allowing
the epidemic to persist for somewhat longer.

6.4. Conclusions
In this chapter, we have constructed a controller for a generalized discrete-time SIS epidemic, which makes decisions so as to optimize a function which balances the need to limit
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(b) Study of the total resource cost incurred.

(a) Study of the processes’ elimination time.

Figure 15: A study of the effect of introducing uncertainty into the spreading graph model,
by way of varying the parameter ν as detailed in Section 6.3.2. The lightest shaded region
contains 98% of the 100 samples generated; the darker shaded region contains 80% of the
100 samples generated. The dark central line is the sample expectation.
resource expenditures against the long-term consequences of letting the epidemic persist in
the network. We have demonstrated that the objective function used to generate this controller is submodular, thereby enabling efficient computational implementation. We have
shown in simulation that the controller exhibits interesting behavior, driving the epidemic
out of existence quickly, while in the process taking actions which are aggressive.

6.5. Technical Arguments
In this section, we communicated detailed proofs of results provided without analysis in the
body of the chapter. Each subsection corresponds to one result referenced without proof
previously.
6.5.1. Proof of Lemma 3
Note that if A = B = 0, then f (W ) = 0, and is trivially submodular. Note also that
if A 6= B, then f (W ) = A1{a∈W
/ } + B1{b∈W
/ } , which is non-negative sum of submodular
functions, so is submodular. It remains to consider A = B = 1. In this case, if a = b, we
have f (W ) = 0, which is trivially submodular. It remains to consider the case in which
a 6= b.
Take Z ⊇ Y, z ∈ Ω \ Z, and suppose neither a nor b are in Z. By Z ⊇ Y, we have that
neither a nor b are in Y. If z ∈ {a, b}, then f (Z ∪ {z}) − f (Z) = 1 = f (Y ∪ {z}) − f (Y ). If
z∈
/ {a, b}, then f (Z ∪ {z}) − f (Z) = 0 = f (Y ∪ {z}) − f (Y ).
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Now, take Z ⊇ Y, z ∈ Ω \ Z, and suppose both a and b are in Z. The condition z ∈ Ω \ Z
implies that z ∈
/ {a, b}, and so f (Z ∪ {z}) − f (Z) = 0 = f (Y ∪ {z}) − f (Y ).
Finally, take Z ⊇ Y, z ∈ Ω \ Z, and suppose exactly one of a or b is in Z. For concreteness,
suppose a ∈ Z. There are two cases to consider. First, suppose a ∈
/ Y. Then, if z ∈
/ {b}, we
have f (Z ∪ {z}) − f (Z) = 0 = f (Y ∪ {z}) − f (Y ). If z ∈ {b}, then f (Z ∪ {z}) − f (Z) =
−1 ≤ f (Y ∪ {z}) − f (Y ) = 1. Now, suppose a ∈ Y. If z ∈
/ {b}, then f (Z ∪ {z}) − f (Z) =
0 = f (Y ∪ {z}) − f (Y ). If z ∈ {b}, then f (Z ∪ {z}) − f (Z) = −1 = f (Y ∪ {z}) − f (Y ). 
6.5.2. Proof of Proposition 2
Before beginning our argument, we first review the definition of a cut capacity function.
Consider a graph defined with respect to the node set [n + 1]0 . A cut capacity defined with
respect to source node 0 and sink node n + 1 is given as
X

g(W ) =

wij ,

(6.17)

(i,j)∈E(W )

where E(W ) , {(i, j) ∈ [n + 1]20 | i ∈ W ∪ {0}, j ∈ {[n] \ W } ∪ {n + 1}}, and the chosen
constants wij are nonnegative.
Now, we argue that all functions f which can be written as (6.15) can be written as (6.17).
Define the edge weights wi(n+1) = αi , wij = βij , and w0i = γi , and consider the corresponding cut capacity function g. We now demonstrate that for all W ⊆ [n], we have
f (W ) − g(W ) = 0, i.e. f and g are equivalent with respect to the ground set [n].
First consider terms included in the sum

P

i∈[n] αi 1{i∈W } .

If i ∈ W, it follows by inclusion

that i ∈ W ∪ {0}. Likewise, (n + 1) ∈ {[n] \ W } ∪ {n + 1}. Hence, for each i ∈ W, there the
corresponding edge (i, n + 1) ∈ E(W ). By definition, win+1 = αi , and so
X
i∈[n]

αi 1{i∈W } =

X

wi(n+1) 1{(i,n+1)∈E(W )}

i∈[n]
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(6.18)

Now consider terms included in the sum

P

/ }.
i∈[n] γi 1{i∈W

If i ∈
/ W, then i ∈ {[n] \ W } ∪

{n + 1}. By definition, 0 ∈ W ∪ {0}. Hence, for each i ∈
/ W, there is a corresponding edge
(0, i) in E(W ). By definition w0i = γi , and so
X

γi 1{i∈W
/ } =

X

w0i 1{(0,i)∈E(W )} .

(6.19)

i∈[n]

i∈[n]

Finally, consider terms included in the sum

P

i∈[n],j∈[n] βij (1{i∈W }

⊕ 1{j∈W } ). If i ∈ W and

j ∈
/ W, then we have i ∈ W ∪ {0} and j ∈ {[n] \ W } ∪ {n + 1}, and hence (i, j) ∈ E(W ).
Likewise, if j ∈ W and i ∈
/ W, then we have an edge (j, i) ∈ E(W ). Since wij = βij by
definition, we have
X
i∈[n],j∈[n]

βij =

X

wij 1{((i,j)∈E(W )} .

(6.20)

(i,j)∈[n]2

Finally, since neither edges of the form (i, 0) nor of the form (n + 1, i) are ever in E(W ),
we have f (W ) = g(W ), as claimed. The argument that any graph capacity function can be
represented as in the form (6.15) can be constructed from similar lines of reasoning, and so
is omitted here.
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CHAPTER 7 : Mitigating Malware Epidemics via Device Reset
In this chapter, we develop a controller tasked with mitigating the effects of a malware
outbreak over a collection of connected devices. This is important, as we can reasonably
expect that most devices which are connected to the Internet will be designed with unintentional security flaws, as the economics of producing Internet-connected devices does
not place sufficient value on security [147]. As such, we may expect sophisticated malware
attacks to become commonplace as we continue to bring further devices online (e.g. as
components of the Internet-of-Things). Indeed, several large-scale cyberattacks have had
significant deleterious effects on the operation of the Internet in recent years [2–4]. These
are likely to increase in frequency and intensity moving forward. Developing methods for
responding to such attacks is essential.
Certainly, one method of responding to this threat is disseminating security patches to
vulnerable devices. Indeed, there are many works which study methods for optimizing
patch dissemination in this setting (see, e.g., [31, 33, 41, 68, 148]). However, it is often the
case that much damage is done by a malware before the security exploit used in the attack
can be identified and addressed by the manufacturer’s response team - this is why zero day
exploits carry significant financial value [149, 150].
As such, it is important to develop response methods for protecting against malware attacks
using networked devices which operate without the capability of patching nodes to inoculate
them against future reinfection. To accomplish this, we must consider leveraging features of
malware which are commonplace, and can be used as control levers to mitigate the effect of
a malware outbreak. One such feature is the widespread vulnerability of malware to device
resets (consider, e.g., the malware Mirai and its variants [2–4]).
While promising in concept, it is not obvious that device resets can be used effectively as a
means for responding to a malware attack. For one reason, device resets take non-negligible
time, and remove resources from the network while they are taking place. For another, a
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reset will not protect a device from reinfection with whatever malware had afflicted it in
the first place, as the security exploit used has not been identified or patched. As such,
it is not obvious when a decision to reset a device should be made, or whether such an
approach can be effective. Indeed, it is not immediately obvious if optimal reset strategies
can be efficiently computed, as models for malware are complicated, and the number of
ways devices can be assigned to reset grows combinatorially with the size of the network.
We address this issue in this chapter, using a discrete-time epidemic as a model for malware.
The primary contribution of this chapter is in demonstrating that optimal device reset strategies can be computed efficiently in a variety of settings, under a mild structural assumption
on the network of devices and the utility function to be optimized. This improves over prior
works studying device reset as a means of malware control [151, 152], in which heuristic
reset policies were designed and assessed. As our results are due primarily to consequences
of a minor structural assumption on the underlying epidemic model and utility function,
and not on context-specific features of malware processes, we expect this technique to be
broadly applicable to epidemic control problems in other settings as well.
Organization

The developments of this chapter progress in three stages. Section 7.1

defines the malware model we consider, and formally details the problem we study. Section
7.2 presents a novel model reduction technique which significantly reduces the complexity of
computing an optimal control policy, as compared against a brute force approach. Section
7.3 considers the performance of the proposed method on particular examples. As with other
chapters, technical arguments which do not add significant value to the main discussion are
presented at the end of the chapter (Section 7.4).

•

7.1. Model and Problem Statement
In this section, we provide details of the malware model we study, and formally state
the problem examined in the chapter. Section 7.1.1 provides a technical description of the
network model. Section 7.1.2 provides a technical description of the malware model. Section
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7.1.3 provides a technical description of the network’s utility model. Section 7.1.4 provides
a formal problem statement.
7.1.1. Network Model
We consider the case of malware propagating on a network of nd interconnected devices,
which can be decomposed into ng groups of statistically identical devices, each of which may
take an arbitrary size, where we notate the particular group g’s size as ndg , and the set of
all groups as G. This assumption seems reasonable for many practical scenarios. Malware
programs often propagate on groups of networks of old, out-of-date network devices (e.g.
routers, security cameras) such that all devices within each group have similar networking
capabilities and security vulnerabilities.
In order to coordinate their actions, we assume all devices communicate with a central
controller. At each time step, every device runs a malware detection routine to asses whether
or not it is currently infected, and reports the result of its test to the central controller. The
central controller then determines which devices, if any, should initiate a reset, with the
decision being made to optimize the network’s performance (details regarding evaluation of
the network’s performance are given in Section 7.1.3 and Section 7.1.4).
7.1.2. Epidemic Model for Mirai-like Malware
As is standard in the study of epidemic processes [82, 89, 137], we model the current status
of a node by membership in one of a set of compartments, each of which are labeled with a
particular symbol ` ∈ L. We denote the indicator that a particular node i is in a particular
P
compartment ` with the 0/1 random variable Xi` , which jointly satisfy `∈L Xi` = 1 for all
nodes i, as each node belongs to exactly one compartment at every time. As Mirai and its
descendants can reinfect devices after they have been reset [2–4], we model it by a discretetime Susceptible-Infected-Removed-Susceptible (SIRS) epidemic. We label nodes which
are not currently infected with malware with S (for Susceptible), nodes which are currently
infected with malware with I (for Infected), and nodes which are currently undergoing a
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device reset with R (for Removed).
Nodes transition between membership in different compartments due to the occurrence of
random events and applied control actions. As described in Chapter 5, transitions are
indicated by functions of the current epidemic state X, and a collection of independent
Bernoulli random variables Y. For a node i to transition from susceptibility to infection, we
have that it comes into contact with at least one infected node j. To indicate this, we write
Y

S→I
S→S
)
Zi(X;Y
) , (1 − Yi0

(1 − YijS→I XjI ),

(7.1)

j∈[nd ]

where we treat the random variables YijS→I as taking the value 1 when node j comes into
contact with node i, and 0 otherwise, and we assign the label 0 to the attacker (represented
S→S takes the value 1 if no successful
as an artificial node in the network). Note that Zi(X;Y
)

infection attempt as been made, and 0 otherwise. Other compartmental transitions are
either forced by internal random events, or control actions. For the transition from infection
to susceptibility, we take ZiI→S = YiI→S . For the transition from removed to susceptibility,
we take ZiR→S = YiR→S . Transitions from susceptibility or infection to reset for node i
happen with probability one if the controller chooses to initiate a device reset of node i,
and probability 0 otherwise. Note that since devices which are currently undergoing a reset
cannot communicate with the central controller, the particular choice of ai has no effect on
nodes which are currently in compartment R.
Assembling this notation in to a mathematical model, we have that node i’s indicator for
compartment S evolves as

S→S
S
I I→S
XiS+ = (1 − ai )(Zi(X;Y
) + XiR ZiR→S .
) Xi + Xi Zi

(7.2)

In a similar fashion, we may write the dynamics of the indicator of infection as

S→S
S
I→S
XiI+ = (1 − ai )((1 − Zi(X;Y
)XiI ),
) )Xi + (1 − Zi
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(7.3)

and the indicators for reset states as

XiR+ = ai (XiS + XiI ) + XiR (1 − ZiR→S ).

(7.4)

In Section 7.1.1, we made the assumption that the network is comprised of a collection
of groups of statistically identical devices. As such, this places some restrictions on the
distributions of the random variables which comprise the process. In particular, we have
that for any two groups g and g 0 in G, if nodes i and k are both elements of group g and
S→I = 1), i.e. the
nodes j and h are elements of group g 0 , then Pr(YijS→I = 1) = Pr(Ykh
S→I are identical. Likewise, we have that for all nodes i in a
distributions of YijS→I and Ykh
0

particular group g, the random variables which indicate internal transitions (i.e. Yi`→` ) are
identically distributed.
Finally, we note that all random variables which indicate the occurrence of events which
0

cause compartmental transitions (i.e. YijS→I or Yi`→` ) are assumed to be mutually independent at all times. This is not a strong assumption, as the elements of the network state
process {X(t)} remain strongly correlated, both across devices in the network and across
time. Note also that this assumption makes practical sense as well, as it suggests that each
device’s inherent properties (e.g. reset time) and the malware’s inherent properties (e.g.
attack strategy) remain fixed in time.
In all, we can see that the process {X(t)} is a controlled Markov chain which evolves on
a state space X with 3nd elements, on which 2nd possible actions a ∈ A can be applied.
Note that each state X ∈ X corresponds to one particular combination of compartmental
memberships, and each action a ∈ A corresponds to one particular assignment of reset
initiations. The principle difficulty in controlling {X(t)} efficiently is due to the large size
of its state space, and the large set of possible actions which can be applied. While in general
it may not be possible to compute an efficient control policy, in Section 7.1.3 we define a
large class of utility functions for which we demonstrate that optimal control policies can
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be computed in polynomial time (using methods developed in Section 7.2).
7.1.3. Utility Model
We assume that the network’s manager provides the controller with some function U which
maps the current state X of the network to a finite, non-negative number corresponding to
the amount of utility derived from the network when it is in state X. For example, if we
consider our network as being a swarm of several types of robots tasked with surveying and
defending an area, we should only care that the total performance of the team is maximized.
P
As such, we may chose U(X) = i∈[nd ],`∈L αg(i)` Xi` , where αg` is some nonnegative constant
denoting how much utility can be derived from a device of type g currently in compartment
`, and we use the notation g(i) to denote a function which maps the index i to its group
membership (in this example, the type of robot of device i). Similarly, if we are concerned
with responding to a Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack, we should chose U to
ensure that the amount of traffic experienced by the targeted server is below its maximum
operating capacity, while also attempting to keep as many network devices operational as
possible. We can accomplish this by choosing

U(X) = 1{P

X
`
i∈[nd ],`∈L βg(i)` Xi ≤θ}

αg(i)` Xi` ,

i∈[nd ],`∈L

where 1{·} is a 0/1 indicator function, βg` is the amount of traffic generated by a device in
group g in compartment `, and θ is the targeted server’s traffic capacity.
Notice that these two choices of utility functions exhibit a particular kind of symmetry,
which we refer to as count symmetry. More precisely, let C be the vector function

Cg` (X) ,

X

Xi` ,

(7.5)

i∈g

i.e. Cg` (X) denotes the count of the devices in group g currently in compartment ` of
the malware model. If it holds that U(X) = U(X 0 ) for all X and X 0 in X such that
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Cg` (X) = Cg` (X 0 ) holds for all device groups g and every compartmental label `, we say
that U is count symmetric. As can be seen from the examples above, count symmetry
can be found in practice where groups of statistically identical devices are involved. This
makes such functions an appropriate object of study; we assume U is count symmetric in
the remainder of the chapter.
7.1.4. Problem Statement
In this paper, we concern ourselves with optimizing the λ-discounted expected return of the
control policy π,
∞
X
Jπ (X) , Eπ [
U(X(τ ))λτ |X(0) = X],

(7.6)

τ =0

where λ ∈ (0, 1), and π is a non-anticipating control policy which maps observations of the
process state {X(t)} to device reset actions a ∈ A. Note that the role of λ in defining J is
suppressed to lighten the notational burden incurred throughout. We consider the problem
of computing an optimal reset policy π, i.e. the solution to the optimal control problem

max Jπ (X),
π∈Π

(7.7)

for all states X ∈ X , where Π is the set of all non-anticipating control policies which map
observations of X to device reset actions a ∈ A, and we assume the utility function U used
to define J is count symmetric (as detailed in Section 7.1.3).
Because {X(t)} is a Markov chain we control by applying one of a finite set of actions A,
and we observe the states and utility, the optimal control porblem (7.7) is a Markov decision
process (see, e.g., [153, Chapter 3] for background). As such, there are standard tools for
computing a solution, both in the case where the transition probabilities are known (e.g.
value iteration; see, e.g., [154, Chapter 1]), and when they are not (e.g. Q-learning; see,
e.g., [154, Chapter 6]). However, the complexity of these methods are a function of the
size of the process’ state and action spaces. Since {X(t)} evolves on a state space with
3nd elements and we may apply 2nd different actions at each state, it should be anticipated
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that (7.7) is in general difficult to solve. As such, the body of the chapter is devoted to
studying whether or not the structural assumptions placed on {X(t)} and U in Sections
7.1.1 through 7.1.3 suffice to make (7.7) efficiently solvable. We develop a model reduction
technique in Section 7.2 that enables (7.7) to be solved in polynomial time. Using the
developed model reduction technique, we study the behavior of optimal reset policies in
Section 7.3 by simulation.

7.2. A Model Reduction Technique
In this section, we demonstrate that (7.7) can be solved in polynomial time. Principally,
we proceed by developing a model reduction technique. We demonstrate how to compute a
lumped representation of (7.7), such that a solution from the lumped problem can be used to
compute a solution to (7.7) itself. To gain an intuition for why this might be possible, note
that the count symmetry of U implies the existence of a function V which maps the vector
C(X) to U(X). Moreover, because the devices within each group are statistically identical,
we might believe that {C(X(t))} is itself a controlled Markov process, where actions can be
modeled as specifying the number of devices to be reset in each group and compartment,
instead of identifying each device to be reset explicitly by its label. It happens to be the
case that this intuition is correct.
ν (X) denote the number of devices of group g in compartment `
To be more precise, let rg`

that are forced to initiate a reset when the network is in state X under the reset policy ν.
Define eνg` (X) as the number of devices in group g and compartment ` which are eligible to
undergo a compartmental membership transition due to some stochastic event (as opposed
to being forced to undergo a reset), i.e.

ν
eνg` (X) , Cg` (X) − rg`
(X).

Define the function
S→S
Z̃i(C(X);
Ỹ )

(X)
Y CgIY
= (1 − Ỹi0 )
(1 − Ỹig,h ),
g∈G h=1
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(7.8)

(7.9)

where when CgI (X) = 0, we take

QCgI (X)
h=1

(1 − Ỹig,h ) = 1, and we let {Ỹk } be a collection of

independent, identically distributed random variables such that for each k, Ỹi0;k takes the
same distribution as Yi0 , and the collection of random variables {Ỹig,h;k }h takes the same
S→S
distribution as Yij for j ∈ g. Note that so defined, Z̃i(C(X);
is a random variable with the
Ỹ )

same distribution of Zi(X;Ỹ ) , written as such to emphasize its dependence only on C(X).
I→S } and {Z̃ R→S } as independent, identically distributed random variaFinally, define {Z̃g,k
g,k
I→S takes the same distribution as Y I→S for i ∈ g, and Z̃ R→S
bles such that for each k, Z̃g,k
i
g,k

takes the same distribution as YiR→S for i ∈ g.
The count of susceptible devices in group g then evolves as
eνgS (X)

X

+

CgS (X ) =

eνgI (X)
S→S
Z̃g(C(X);
Ỹk )

+

k=1

X

CgR (X)
I→S
Z̃g,k
+

k=1

X

R→S
Z̃g,k
.

(7.10)

k=1

Likewise, the dynamics of CgI (X) can be written as
eνgS (X)

CgI (X + ) =

X

eνgI (X)
S→S
1 − Z̃g(C(X);
+
Ỹ )

X

k

k=1

I→S
,
1 − Z̃g,k

(7.11)

k=1

and the dynamics for CgR (X) can be written as
CgR (X)
+

CgR (X ) =

ν
rgS
(X)

+

ν
rgI
(X)

+

X

R→S
1 − Z̃g,k
.

(7.12)

k=1

By inspection of (7.10)-(7.12), it can be seen that {C(X)} is a function only of number
of devices forced to initiate a reset at any particular state C(X), and not the particular
identity of the devices involved. Hence, we have the following result:
Proposition 3 (Policy Equivalence) Let π be a reset policy which maps network states
π (X) devices of group g in compartment ` are
X ∈ X to reset decisions a ∈ A such that rg`

forced to initiate a reset when the network is in state X. Let µ be a reset policy which maps
µ
compartmental membership counts C(X) to reset decisions such that rg`
(C(X)) devices of
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group g in compartment ` are forced to initiate a reset when the compartmental node count
is C(X). Fix some initial condition X(0).
π (X) = r µ (C(X)) almost surely for all X ∈ X , g ∈ G and ` ∈ L, then
If it holds that rg`
g`

{C(Xπ (t))}t≥0 = {C(X(t))µ }t≥0 holds almost surely.
ν , and the random
Proof : From (7.10)-(7.12), the process {C(X(t))} is a function of rg`
0

`→` }. Since r π (X) = r µ (C(X)) almost surely for all X ∈ X , g ∈ G
variables {Ỹk } and {Z̃i,k
g`
g`

and ` ∈ L, it follows that {C(Xπ (t))}t≥0 = {C(X(t))µ }t≥0 holds almost surely.



Proposition (3) suggests that we can compute an optimal control policy which acts on
observations of states X ∈ X and gives actions a ∈ A by computing an optimal control
policy µ which acts on observations of compartmental membership counts C(X), and gives
actions which specify only the number of devices to be reset in each group and compartment,
as opposed to the devices’ particular identities.
This is useful, because the set of all possible compartmental membership counts has substantially fewer than 3nd elements, and the number of different ways of selecting device
counts to be reset is substantially smaller than 2nd . To be more precise, define V as a
function which maps C(X) to U(X). Consider the lumped optimal control problem

max Vµ (C(X)),

µ∈M

with Vµ (X) , Eµ [

P∞

τ
τ =0 V(C(X)(τ ))λ |C(X)(0)

(7.13)

= C(X)], and where M is the set of all

non-anticipating control policies which map C(X) to a particular count of devices to be
reset in each group, compartment pair. Optimal solutions of (7.13) can be used to compute
an optimal solution of (7.7), as the following certifies.
Theorem 8 (Equivalence of Solutions) Let µ? be an optimal solution to the lumped
optimal control problem (7.13). Then, the policy πµ? , which upon observing C(X) assigns
?

µ
exactly min{rgS
(C(X)), CgS (X)} susceptible devices of group g to be reset uniformly at
?

µ
random and exactly min{rgI
(C(X)), CgI (X)} infected devices of group g to be reset uni-

92

formly at random for each group g ∈ G, is an optimal solution of (7.7).
Proof : See Section 7.4.1.



Since (7.13) is a Markov decision process, it can be solved in polynomial time with respect to
the number of states of the system, and actions in the action set (see, e.g., [155, Theorem 1]),
provided the transition probabilities are known. This is important, because the complexity
of representing (7.13) is substantially less than the complexity of representing (7.7). To
demonstrate this precisely, consider the following result:
Lemma 4 (A Combinatorial Identity) Let Φp (m) be the set of all combinations of
exactly p natural numbers which sum to m, and let φp (m) denote the cardinality of Φp (m).
We have
φp (m) =

(m + p − 1)!
.
m!(p − 1)!

(7.14)

p−1

m
Moreover, for each fixed p, φp (m) grows as O( (p−1)!
).

Proof : See Section 7.4.2.



Since for each group g, the count of nodes taking membership in each of the three model
compartments must equal ndg , we have that C(X) evolves on the state space ×g∈G Φ3 (ndg ).
From Lemma 4, this set contains exactly ×g∈G

(ndg +2)!
ndg !2!

elements, and as such grows as

O(nd 2ng ). This grows polynomially for a fixed number of device groups, as opposed to X ,
which grows as 3nd .
Likewise, we may use Φ3 (ndg ) to encode all possible ways of assigning devices to be reset in a
µ
µ
particular group g. In particular, for any C(X) we must have that rgS
(C(X)) + rgI
(C(X)) ≤

ndg , as there are only ndg devices in group g total. As such, for any particular d ∈ Φ3 (ndg ),
µ
µ
µ
µ
we can assign d1 = rgS
(C(X)), d2 = rgI
(C(X)), and d3 = ndg − rgS
(C(X)) − rgI
(C(X)).

Hence, the set of possible actions of (7.13) grows as O(nd 2ng ), which is substantially less
than 2nd elements needed to represent A.
Considering this, it seems that (7.7) may itself be solvable in polynomial time. Indeed, all
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that is left to show to demonstrate this is an efficient method of constructing the transition
probabilities Pr(C(X̃)|C(X), d) for all possible values of C(X̃), C(X), and all d ∈ D ,
×g∈G Φ3 (ndg ). This is not trivial. Indeed, a naı̈ve approach to this computation would
involve summing over the exponentially large set of possible events which could cause the
transition C(X) → C(X̃) when the action d is applied. Our next result demonstrates
that, provided the distributions (i.e. success probabilities) of the contact random variables
0

{YijS→I } and internal transition random variables {Yi`→` } are known for each group, then
each entry to the table of values for Pr(C(X̃)|C(X), d) can be computed in polynomial time.
Proposition 4 (Computing Transition Probabilities) Consider the model detailed in
0

S→I } and {Y `→` } (denoted
Section 7.1.2. If the distributions for the random variables {Ygg
0
g

and PY `→`0 , respectively) are known for each g, g 0 ∈ G and `, `0 ∈ L, then each
PY S→I
0
gg

g

transition probability Pr(C(X̃)|C(X), d) can be computed in O(ng nd 6 ) time. Consequently,
all such probabilities can be computed in O(ng nd 6ng +6 ) time.
Proof : Since the transitions of nodes within each group are conditionally independent
given the counts of compartmental memberships of nodes in all groups of the graph, we can
decompose the probability into the product

Pr(C(X̃)|C(X), d) =

Y

Pr(Cg (X) → Cg (X̃)|C(X), d).

g∈G

Hence, if we can compute the values Pr(Cg (X) → Cg (X̃)|C(X), d) in polynomial time, we
can compute Pr(C(X̃)|C(X), d) in polynomial time as well. To demonstrate how this is
possible, we decompose the event {Cg (X) → Cg (X̃)}.
If the action d is applied, then min{dgS , CgS (X)} susceptible nodes and min{dgI , CgI (X)}
infected nodes of group g are forced to initiate a reset. Hence, there are cgXS , CgS (X) −
min{dgS , CgS (X)} susceptible nodes, cgXI , CgI (X) − min{dgI , CgI (X)} infected nodes,
and cgXR , CgR (X) removed nodes from group g which will make a stochastic transition.
To result with a node count Cg (X̃) after the transition occurs, we must have that the
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number of nodes which transition to susceptibility stochastically to equal cgX̃S , CgS (X̃),
the number of nodes which transition to infected stochastically to equal cgX̃I , CgI (X̃),
and the number of nodes which transition to recovered stochastically to equal cgX̃R ,
CgR (X̃) − min{dgS , CgS (X)} − min{dgI , CgI (X)}.
P
Let Ψg|d (X, X̃) be the subset of ZL×L
`0 ∈L ψ``0 = cgX` holds for all ` ∈ L and
≥0 such that
P
0
`∈L ψ``0 = cg X̃`0 holds for all ` ∈ L. So defined, each ψ in Ψg|d (X, X̃) defines one way for
the random transitions to occur, such that the transition Cg (X) → Cg (X̃) occurs. As such,
we have
{Cg (X) → Cg (X̃)} = ∪ψ∈Ψg|d (X,X̃) {∩`∈L {∩`0 ∈L ψ``0 }},

(7.15)

where we use the shorthand notation ψ``0 for the event that exactly ψ``0 devices currently in
compartment ` transitions to compartment `0 ∈ L due to random events. Since the elements
of Ψg|d (X, X̃) are disjoint, we have by additivity that
Pr(Cg (X) → Cg (X̃)|C(X), d) =

X

Pr(∩`∈L {∩`0 ∈L ψ``0 }|C(X)),

(7.16)

ψ∈Ψg|d (X,X̃)

where we have dropped the dependence on d in the right-hand-side expression to emphasize
that all nodes considered in this calculation were not chosen to be reset, and so are unaffected
˜ By construction, the events
by the choice of action. Fix some compartmental labels ` and `.
∩`0 ∈L {ψ``0 } and ∩`0 ∈L {ψ``
˜ 0 } are conditionally independent, given C(X). This follows from
noting that given C(X), the transition probabilities of each node are fixed, and each node
transitions independently. Note that the events ψ``0 are correlated conditioned on C(X),
but only insofar that each particular node may transition only once, so grouping as above
poses no issue, as by definition each node belongs only to one compartment at all times.
From this, we may then write
Pr(∩`∈L {∩`0 ∈L ψ``0 }|C(X)) =

Y
`∈L
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Pr({∩`0 ∈L ψ``0 }|C(X)).

(7.17)

Since all nodes in a particular group which are also in the same compartment are statistically
identical, we may compute the probability

Pr({∩`0 ∈L ψ``0 }|C(X)) =

where

cgX` 
{ψ``0 }`0 ∈L

cgX`
{ψ``0 }`0 ∈L

 Y

0

Pr(Xg` → Xg` |C(X))ψ``0

(7.18)

ψ``0 >0
0

is the multinomial coefficient, and we define Pr(Xg` → Xg` |C(X)) as the

probability of a device in group g and compartment ` transitioning to compartment `0 , given
the current compartmental membership count C(X), i.e.

Pr(Xg`

→

0
Xg` |C(X))

,


Q



)Cg0 I (X)
(1 − PYg0 ) g0 ∈G (1 − PY S→I


gg 0




Q


)Cg0 I (X)
1 − (1 − PYg0 ) g0 ∈G (1 − PY S→I


gg 0





1 − P
YgI→S




PYgI→S









1 − PYgR→S





PY R→S
g

` = S, `0 = S
` = S, `0 = I
` = I, `0 = I
(7.19)
`=

I, `0

=S

` = R, `0 = R
` = R, `0 = S.

Note that the validity of (7.19) can be verified by studying (7.2)-(7.4), and noting the
independence of the random variables {Y }. Note also that the use of the multinomial
coefficient in (7.18) accounts for the number of ways the cgX` devices can be assigned to
make the required transitions {ψ``0 }`0 ∈L occur, i.e. the number of ways of assigning each of
the cgX` devices to exactly one compartment after transition, such that ψ`S are assigned to
S, ψ`I are assigned to I, and ψ`R are assigned to R.
Assembling this calculation, we have

Pr(Cg (X) → Cg (X̃)|C(X), d) =

X

Y

ψ∈Ψg|d (X,X̃) `∈L

cgX`
{ψ``0 }`0 ∈L

 Y

0

Pr(Xg` → Xg` |C(X))ψ``0 .

ψ``0 >0

(7.20)
Since there are three elements in L, and the elements of ψ of Ψg|d (X, X̃) are natural numbers
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constrained to add to a number no greater than ndg , Ψg|d (X, X̃) is a subset of (Φ3 (ndg ))3 .
Hence, Lemma 4 implies that evaluating (7.20) takes at most O(ndg 6 ) time. Computing
the transition probabilities for each group individually and then computing their product to
obtain the joint probability takes at most O(ng nd 6 ) operations, and as there are O(nd 6ng ) entries in the table of transition probabilities, we can compute the entire table in O(ng nd 6ng +6 )
time, as claimed.



Note that this complexity analysis is quite conservative, as the set Ψg|d (X, X̃) will have
less than O(ndg 6 ) elements, and there are many transitions which occur with probability
zero, and so need not be explicitly computed (e.g., consider any transition in which dgS +
dgI < CgR (X̃) − CgR (X)). However, this argument alone is enough to verify that (7.7)
can be represented as a Markov decision process with state and action spaces which grows
polynomially with respect to nd , and this representation can be computed in polynomial
time. Since Markov decision processes can be solved in polynomial time (see, e.g., [155,
Theorem 1]), we then have that (7.7) is a polynomial-time problem. This is an important
result in principle, as it demonstrates that under broad assumptions, optimal reset policies
can be computed without explicitly using the state space representation X , or action set
representation A, and so may be computed efficiently.

7.3. An Example Problem: Simulations and Implementation Details
We study an example in this section. We consider a case where the network consists of
nd = 20 devices, all of one type. Time advances at six increments per minute, i.e. every time
step is ten seconds in duration. Infected devices spread malware to unaffected devices with
probability 0.5 at each time step, i.e. PY S→I = 0.5 for all (i, j) ∈ [nd ]2 . The attacker infects
ij

an uninfected node with probability 0.05 at each time, i.e. PY S→I = 0.05. This corresponds
i0

to the attacker re-installing malware on vulnerable devices once approximately every three
minutes. We set PY R→S = 0.167, which corresponds to a reset taking approximately one
i

minute, and PY I→S = 0, so that an infected device remains so persistently, unless it is reset.
i
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As a utility function, we take

U(X) = 1{P

i∈[nd

I
] Xi ≤10}

X

XiS + 0.95XiI .

i∈[nd ]

This function captures a scenario in which infected devices can still perform their required
task when a malware attack is happening, but at a slightly reduced capacity. However, if
too many devices become infected (here, more than 10), some critical system component
becomes inoperable. This is precisely what happens when DDoS attacks are launched using
security cameras: the quality of the camera’s surveillance capability declines negligibly, but
after sufficiently many become infected, they can launch a sufficiently strong attack to shut
down a web server [156]. To finish specifying, we set the discount factor λ = 0.99.
Note that the space X contains 320 u 3.5 × 109 elements, while the space A contains
220 u 1 × 106 elements. As such, directly solving (7.7) would be prohibitively expensive.
In the lumped representation developed in Section 7.2, C(X) takes only 231 distinct values,
and the action set D contains only 231 distinct actions. In principle, our model reduction
technique enables the specified problem to be solved efficiently. We study this numerically
in the following subsections.
7.3.1. Computing Optimal Controls with Known Parameters
We use the computation outlined by (7.20) to compute the transition probabilities for the
lumped problem, and use value iteration to solve (7.13) (see [154, Chapter 1] for relevant
background, and [157] for a freely available software package which can perform the relevant
computations). Figure 16 provides a depiction of the optimal control policy computed.
Studying this figure reveals that the structure of the computed optimal policy is complicated.
There are regions of the state space in which susceptible devices are reset preemptively, and
regions in which several infected devices are not reset.
It is not clear that such a policy can be anticipated intuitively. However, it is worth
investigating the performance of a heuristic policy, to determine if we have gained substantial
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Figure 16: Optimal reset policy of the problem studied in Section 7.3. Figure (a) demonstrates that determining when to reset a susceptible node is complicated. In many states,
it is optimal to reset a subset of susceptible nodes, but the size of the subset is a complicated function. Figure (b) demonstrates that determining when to reset an infected node
is complicated. In many states, it is optimal to keep infected nodes in the system, without
immediately forcing a reset.

(a) Simulation of Optimal Reset Policy

(b) Simulation of Heuristic Reset Policy

Figure 17: A comparison of the performance of the process under the optimal control policy
µ? (Figure 17a) and a policy which immediately resets all infected nodes and never resets
any susceptible devices (Figure 17b). The dark lines are the sample expectation, the dark
shaded regions contain the middle 80% of the sample trajectories, the lightly shaded regions
contain the middle 98% of the sample trajectories. Notably, the average stage utility of µ?
is consistently several units higher than the heuristic.
performance by computing an optimal policy. Figure 17 studies the performance of the
heuristic policy in which all infected devices are forced to reset, and no susceptible devices
are forced to reset. Ten thousand sample trajectories were generated. It can be readily seen
that the optimal policy significantly outperforms the heuristic policy.
7.3.2. Computing Optimal Controls with Unknown Parameters
Here, we assess the applicability of the results developed in Section 7.2 to computing optimal
reset strategies in the case where the model’s parameters {PY } are unknown a priori. This
may be the case if the controller is to construct strategies online, or when a simulator of
the malware attack can be developed easily, but an explicit analytical model is difficult to
specify. As an approach to this task, we use the Q-learning algorithm. As there are many
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references which give detailed accounts of the Q-learning algorithm and its convergence
properties (e.g. [154, 158, 159]), we shall only briefly review here.
For a generic Markov decision process with states w ∈ W and actions u ∈ U, the Q-learning
algorithm operates by building a table of factors Q(w, u) which approximate the value of
taking the action u in state w, assuming that optimal actions will be chosen at all future
times. In this way, we see that if the true values of the Q-factors were known, the optimal
control would be given by selecting u ∈ arg maxũ∈U Q(w, ũ) at all times. To build the table
of Q-factors, Q-learning operates by updating each factor Q(w, u) whenever action u is
applied in state w according to

Q(w, u) ← αt Q(w, u) + (1 − αt )(B + λ max Q(w+ , ũ)),
ũ∈U

where αt is a step size in (0, 1), B is the utility observed by applying action u in state w,
and w+ denotes the state transitioned into from w as a result of having applied action u.
If it is ensured that each state-action pair (w, u) is visited infinitely often and the step size
P∞ 2
P
process {αt } is chosen such that ∞
t=0 αt < ∞, this procedure will cause
t=0 αt = ∞ and
the Q-factors to converge to their correct values [159].
Because we have shown that all policies which remove the same number of susceptible
and infected nodes for a given compartmental membership count induce identical behavior
(Proposition 3), it follows that there exists an optimal solution of (7.13) such that in C(X),
only actions which satisfy ds ≤ CS (X) and dI ≤ CI (X) are used. Let D(C(X)) denote the
set of actions which satisfy these inequalities. Observe that sampling actions from D(C(X))
uniformly at random at each state will see to it that all states C(X) are visited infinitely
often, as random actions will force the process at state C(X) to attain any target state
C(Y ) with positive probability in at most three time steps (see Section 7.4.3). As such,
we may adequately explore the space by applying a variation of the -greedy approach to
action selection. In particular, at each time t, we select an action uniformly at random from
˜
D(C(X)) with probability t ∈ (0, 1), and an optimal action d ∈ arg maxd∈D(C(X))
Q(C(X), d)
˜
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Figure 18: Convergence of the value of the policy learned by Q-learning (in blue) to the
value attained by an optimal policy (in black). Performance is evaluated with respect to the
expectation of the value function Vµ (C(X)), taken with respect to the stationary distribution
of X under the evaluated policy µ.
otherwise.
In our simulations, we choose αt = (t + 1)−

1.01
2

1
), where the index t
, and t = 1 − ln( t+2

represents the training sample currently under consideration. We use the example studied
in Section 7.3.1 to generate data, so that we may compare our learned policy against an
optimal one. This helps us to verify visually that the learning process specified indeed causes
the learned policy to converge as hoped. Figure 18 verifies this to be the case. This result
motivates further work in investigating learning-based control strategies for optimizing reset
strategies to protect against malware outbreaks.

7.4. Technical Arguments
In this section, we provide detailed technical arguments of the results presented in the body
of the chapter. Each subsection corresponds to one particular results which was referenced
in the chapter without explicit proof.
7.4.1. Proof of Theorem 8
Before arguing for Theorem 8, it helps to establish the following side-result, which provides
a helpful structural property.
Lemma 5 (Value Function Structure) Let µ be a policy to the lumped control problem
(7.13), and let πµ be a policy to the optimal control problem 6.1 such that at state X, for
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µ
µ
all groups g ∈ G, rgS
(X) susceptible nodes and rgI
(X) infected nodes of group g are forced

to initiate a reset. That is, for all states X ∈ X , the policies µ and πµ force the same
count of nodes to initiate resets from each group, compartment pair. Then, it holds that
Jπµ (X) = Vµ (C(X)).
Proof : See Section 7.4.4.



Essentially, Lemma 5 demonstrates that for a pair of policies such as µ? and πµ? , the
corresponding value functions must be equal at all states with the same node count.
Now, to certify the optimality of πµ? , we demonstrate that the value function Jπµ? satisfies
Bellman’s optimality condition,

Jπµ? (X) = U(X) + λ max{E[Jπµ? (X + )|X, a]}.
a∈A

(7.21)

Since µ? is optimal for the lumped problem, we have

Vµ? (C(X)) = V(C(X)) + λ max{E[Vµ? (C(X)+ )|C(X), d]}.
d∈D

(7.22)

From Lemma 5, we have Jπµ? (X) = Vµ? (C(X)). From the count symmetry of U, we have
U(X) = V(C(X)). By combining expressions and rearranging terms, we can demonstrate
that (7.21) holds if we demonstrate that

max{E[Jπµ? (X + )|X, a]} = max{E[Vµ? (C(X)+ )|C(X), d]}
a∈A

d∈D

(7.23)

holds. We can argue this equality by definition.
Note that
E[Vµ? (C(X)+ )|C(X), d] =

X

Vµ? (c) Pr(C(X)+ = c|C(X), d),

c∈C
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(7.24)

and
E[Jπµ? (X + )|X, a] =

X

Jπµ? (x) Pr(X + = x|X, a),

(7.25)

x∈X

where we have defined the set C to be the set of all possible values of C(X), i.e.

C , ∪X∈X {C(X)}.

From Lemma 5, we have
X

Jπµ? (x) Pr(X + = x|X, a) =

XX

Jπµ? (x) Pr(C(X)+ = x|X, a)

c∈C x∈Xc

x∈X

=

X

Vµ? (c)

c∈C

(7.26)
X

+

Pr(C(X) = x|X, a),

x∈Xc

where we defined Xc as the subset of X such that C(X) = c.
If we can now show that for each action a ∈ A, there exists some corresponding da ∈ D
such that
X

Pr(X + = x|X, a) = Pr(C(X)+ = c|C(X), da )

(7.27)

x∈Xc

holds, and for each action d ∈ D, there exists some corresponding action ad ∈ A such that
X

Pr(X + = x|X, ad ) = Pr(C(X)+ = c|C(X), d)

(7.28)

x∈Xc

holds, then the desired relation (7.23) will be verified, as the functions to be maximized in
(7.23) will then necessarily take values on the same range when passed arguments from A
and D, respectively. The existence of actions which satisfy (7.27) and (7.28) follow from
the structural assumptions placed on the problem in Section 7.1.
P
In particular, to verify (7.27), choose an arbitrary a ∈ A, and then choose dagS = i∈g∩VS (X) ai ,
P
and dagI = i∈g∩VI (X) ai , where VS (X) and VI (X) are the set of susceptible and infected
nodes in state X, respectively. Because nodes belonging to the same group are statistically
identical and the number of devices reset in each group and compartment are identical,
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(7.27) holds. To verify (7.28), choose an arbitrary d ∈ D, and choose any ad ∈ A such that
P
P
dgS = i∈g∩VS (X) adi , and dgI = i∈g∩VI (X) adi . Because nodes belonging to the same group
are statistically identical, and the number of devices reset in each group and compartment
are identical, (7.28) holds. This completes the argument.



7.4.2. Proof of Lemma 4
For the case in which p = 1, it is by definition true that φ1 (m) = 1, as the only sum of one
natural number which equals m is m itself. For larger values of p, we note that φp (m) can
be defined recursively. In particular, the number of ways to construct a sum of p natural
numbers to add to m is exactly the sum of all ways of adding p − 1 natural numbers to sum
to each j ∈ [m]0 , as for each value j, the p’th value of the sum must equal m − j. Hence
φp (m) satisfies:
φp (m) =

m
X

φp−1 (j).

(7.29)

j=0

We now solve (7.29) via induction.
To elucidate our later choice of induction hypothesis, we first note that for p = 2, we have
P
φ2 (m) = m
j=0 1 = m + 1. For p = 3, we have

φ3 (m) =

m
X

(j + 1) =

j=0

(m + 1)m
2

(7.30)

(m + 2)!
=
m!(3 − 1)
where we use the identity for the sum of the first m positive integers in the first line, and
rearrange terms in the second. We then may take

φp (m) =

(m + p − 1)!
m!(p − 1)!
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(7.31)

as a base for induction. To complete this argument, we must show that (7.31) implies that

φp+1 (m) =

(m + p)!
m!p!

(7.32)

P
holds. We have by definition that φp+1 (m) = m
j=0 φp (m), and so it suffices to show that
Pm (j+p−1)!
(m+p)!
j=0 j!(p−1)! = m!p! , where we have used our hypothesis in the sum on the left-hand
P
(j+p−1)!
side. By multiplying both sides by (p − 1)!, we obtain m
= (m+p)!
j=0
j!
m!p . We now
Pm (j+p−1)!
to demonstrate the desired identity.
analyze j=0
j!
Consider the partial sum Fh (p) =

Ph

j=0

(j+p−1)!
.
j!

We may evaluate F0 (p) directly to obtain

F0 (p) = (p − 1)!. Similarly, we may evaluate F1 (p) as

F1 (p) = (p − 1)! + p! = (p + 1)[(p − 1)!] =

(p + 1)!
.
p

As an induction hypothesis on this sequence of partial sums with respect to the index
h, we may then take Fh−1 (p) =
Fh−1 (p) +

(h+p−1)
,
h!

(h−1+p)!
(h−1)!p .

We have by definition of Fh (p) that Fh (p) =

and so h!pFh (p) = h(h + p − 1)! + p(h + p − 1)! = (h + p)!.

After rearranging terms, we have verified that Fh (p) = (h+p)!
h!p , verifying our induction hypotPm (j+p−1)!
hesis on Fh (p). By definition, this implies that j=0
= (m+p)!
j!
m!p , which verifies that
our induction hypothesis on φp (m) holds.
p−1

m
To close the proof, it remains to show that φp (m) grows as O( (p−1)!
). Note that we have

shown φp (m) =

(m+p−1)!
m!(p−1)! ,

which factors as φp (m) =

(m+p−1)(m+p−2)···(m+1)
,
(p−1)!

From this, it
p−1

m
can be seen that φp (m) is a (p − 1)’th order polynomial of m, which grows as O( (p−1)!
). 

7.4.3. Verifying Adequate Exploration
We may transition from any particular state C(X) to any other state C(Y ) with positive
probability in no more than three time steps. This can be accomplished by the following
sequence of events. First, take action to reset all devices which are not currently undergoing
a reset in C(X). This places a positive probability that the process is in the state where all
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devices are undergoing a reset. If this state is attained, all applied actions have the same
effect. There is positive probability that the process is next in the state where all nodes
are susceptible. If this state is attained, take action such that CR (Y ) devices are forced to
reset. This places positive probability on the system transitioning to state C(Y ).



7.4.4. Proof of Lemma 8
We verify the claim by construction. In particular, note that

Jπµ (X) = Eπµ [

∞
X

λτ U(X(τ ))|X(0) = X],

(7.33)

τ =0

and
∞
X
Vµ (C(X)) = Eπµ [
λτ V(C(X)(τ ))|C(X)(0) = C(X)].

(7.34)

τ =0

By Proposition 3, since µ and πµ initiate resets in the same number of susceptible and
infected devices in each group at all possible states, we have that the distributions of
{C(X)µ (τ )}τ ≥0 and {C(Xπµ (τ ))}τ ≥0 are equivalent. From the count symmetry of U, we
have that for any given X, it holds that U(X) = V(C(X)). Combining these facts, we have
that the expectations on the right-hand-sides of (7.33) and (7.34) must evaluate to the same
value. Hence, Jπµ (X) = Vµ (C(X)), as claimed.
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CHAPTER 8 : Conclusions and Directions for Future Work
In this text, we have presented some contributions to the theory of epidemic control. The
first two results, developed in Chapters 3 and 4, were focused on addressing some issues raised in works considering the analysis and control of continuous-time epidemics. In particular, Chapter 3 presents a novel moment closure technique, which allows the evolution of the
statistics of continuous-time epidemic processes to be predicted efficiently, to within nontrivial error. As developing such a method has been considered a question of significant interest
to the community [14, Section 9], we believe the technique presented is of interest. Chapter
4 develops a controller which leverages the moment closure method of Chapter 3 to provide
strong convergence guarantees, in a way that generalizes to arbitrary epidemic processes.
This work advances beyond previous efforts in this area in that its convergence guarantees
are stochastic (as opposed to the mean-field, c.f. [8, 12, 43, 44, 46, 50, 81, 98–100, 102–104]),
and in that guarantees still hold when considering discrete control actions (c.f. [57, 101]).
However, despite being well-positioned with respect to prior work within the literature, this
method was found to be computationally costly.
As a consequence, we changed our focus to the study of discrete-time epidemics. As these
processes share the same qualitative features which motivate the study of continuous-time
epidemics, they seem to be practically useful objects of study. As they are simpler to analyze, we found it possible to construct efficiently implementable controllers in two settings.
In Chapter 6, we demonstrated how a controller which allocates discrete protective resources to mitigate a biological disease could be formulated in such a way that its accompanying
optimization problem can be solved in polynomial time with respect to the number of agents
in the network. In Chapter 7, we considered the problem of computing device reset strategies to optimize the system’s behavior when under attack from a malware. We showed it to
be possible to construct a low-complexity representation of the attendant optimal control
problem, which can be solved in polynomial time with respect to the number of device in
the network. Together, we believe these results show there to be promise in considering the
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control of discrete-time epidemics.
In closing this dissertation, it is appropriate to remark on a few directions for possible
future work. In Section 8.1, we discuss work which is important to closing the gap between
the theory and practice of controlling biological epidemics. In Section 8.2, we discuss work
which is important to developing scalable malware mitigation controllers.

8.1. Private and Fair Control of Biological Epidemics
In Chapter 6, we presented a method for containing a biological epidemic which evolves
according to discrete-time SIS dynamics. Our primary contribution was technical: we
demonstrated that a particular optimal control problem could be written as a submodular
minimization problem, and hence efficiently solved. However, our work did not address
some considerations which are likely to be of significant importance when moving forward
in such a domain, such as privacy and fairness.
People should not be expected to trust in the decisions made by a control algorithm if
that algorithm is not first demonstrated to preserve an appropriate amount of privacy
regarding the information provided to the algorithm. Indeed, an algorithm preferentially
selecting a particular individual for treatment of a sexually transmitted infection may alert
others to a high likelihood of promiscuity that said individual may like to keep secret.
Determining how to implement a control scheme such as the one we have developed in
such a way that all agents’ privacy is maintained to a reasonable extent over time when
the controller is in use is critical. While there are a number of different formal notions of
privacy, and many results concerning the maintenance of privacy on static data sets [160],
maintaining privacy for a closed-loop system seems to be task with many open challenges
at present [161, 162]. Determining how actions can be taken to control epidemics without
leaking private information is an important problem to address moving forward.
As with privacy preservation, people should not be expected to trust in the decisions made
by a control algorithm if that algorithm is not first demonstrated to choose actions in
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a way which is fair. Indeed, there are already well-documented cases of decision support
algorithms taking decisions which exhibit racial bias [163]. Such behavior is an unacceptable
feature for a controller tasked with making decisions regarding the health and well being of
real people. As work concerning fairness in control is still in its infancy [164], it is difficult
to say for sure whether or not such a goal can be attained under reasonable assumptions.
Continued work developing results regarding private, fair stochastic control seems a critical
requirement of advancing the use of modern control techniques in social settings in general,
with the control of biological epidemics being a prominent example of such. We hope that
the work we have presented here will provide some guidance on how such controllers can be
structured to obtain useful control behaviors.

8.2. Effective Learning Methods for Large-scale Network Protection
In Chapter 7, we presented a method for responding to a malware attack levied on a
collection of networked systems. The central result communicated was a technique for
writing the optimal control problem on a state-action space which grows polynomially with
respect to the number of devices in the network, as opposed to the exponentially many that
would be required by a naı̈ve approach. More precisely, the complexity of computing an
optimal control law was shown to be exponential in the number of groups of statistically
identical devices, and not the number of devices itself. This enabled the use of techniques
from Markov decision processes and reinforcement learning to be used efficiently without
major modification for applications in which most devices are interchangeable, and the total
number of devices moderate.
For large-scale applications, it is likely that more study is needed. For one reason, it seems
that large networks may be comprised of many different groups of devices. As such, the
complexity of explicitly accounting for the number of possible compartmental membership
counts and deciding on device reset counts for each group as we have done will be considerable. There are likely many approaches which can be tried to address this problem. We
consider one here for concreteness. It is easy to imagine that in a large network, there will
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be several components which act nearly independently of each other. If this is the case, it
seems plausible that community detection algorithms (see, e.g., [165] and references therein)
can be used to determine which groups of devices should be considered independently. After
this determination is made, a controller can be designed for each community independently,
where control actions are taken within each community without regard to the state of the
others. While this method will likely not find an optimal control law, it may well find a
law which performs well enough to be worth pursuing. Only testing an implementation is
likely to determine whether or not this is true.
Additionally, it seems in this setting that incorporating means for learning how to adapt
to a changing network will be critical to the successful deployment of such a controller. In
a small-scale setting, one may imagine that most applications will come from protecting
against attacks on precisely engineered systems, where the designers may have explicit knowledge of how frequently nodes are supposed to communicate with each other. Additionally,
designers are more likely to be able to anticipate the sort of attacks their enemies will levy
on them, and so can anticipate in advance what sort of simulation should be used to train
the controller. In this setting, the methods we have developed in Chapter 7 are appropriate.
However, the case is different for large-scale networks.
As a particular example, consider the Internet. There is no central means of controlling
which devices connect to the Internet, and so its structure constantly changes. Hence, it
is not likely that a malware mitigation controller can be trained thoroughly in advance by
a carefully constructed simulator. More likely, it will be the case that the controller will
need to be trained to learn how to learn efficient protection strategies quickly, by exposing
it to a variety of different possible attack methods. Such techniques (termed metalearning)
have begun to draw interest in the robotics community, where they have experienced some
success in demonstrating robots which can adapt to changing environments quickly [166–
168]. Determining if these techniques work well for malware mitigation seems an interesting
task. We hope the results we have presented here provide inspiration for such work.
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[83] S. Gómez, J. Gómez-Gardeñes, Y. Moreno, and A. Arenas, “Nonperturbative heterogeneous mean-field approach to epidemic spreading in complex networks,” Physical
Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and Soft Matter Physics, vol. 84, no. 3, pp. 1–7,
2011.
[84] I. Tomovski and L. Kocarev, “Simple Algorithm for Virus Spreading Control on
Complex Networks,” IEEE Transactions on Circuits and Systems I: Regular Papers,
vol. 59, no. 4, pp. 763–771, 2012.
[85] C. Granell, S. Gómez, and A. Arenas, “Competing spreading processes on multiplex
networks: Awareness and epidemics,” Physical Review E - Statistical, Nonlinear, and
Soft Matter Physics, vol. 90, no. 1, pp. 1–7, 2014.
[86] A. Stanoev, D. Trpevski, and L. Kocarev, “Modeling the spread of multiple concurrent
contagions on networks,” PLoS ONE, vol. 9, no. 6, pp. 1–16, 2014.
[87] H. J. Ahn and B. Hassibi, “Global dynamics of epidemic spread over complex networks,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, no. 1, 2013,
pp. 4579–4585.
[88] ——, “On the Mixing Time of the SIS Markov Chain Model for Epidemic Spread,” in
Proceedings of the 2014 IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 2014, pp. 6221–
6227.
[89] N. A. Ruhi and B. Hassibi, “SIRS epidemics on complex networks: Concurrence of exact Markov chain and approximated models,” in Proceedings of the IEEE Conference
on Decision and Control, 2015, pp. 2919–2926.
[90] N. A. Ruhi, C. Thrampoulidis, and B. Hassibi, “Improved Bounds on the
Epidemic Threshold of Exact SIS Models on Complex Networks,” in Proceedings
of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 2016. [Online]. Available:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1603.05095
[91] C. Eksin, J. S. Shamma, and J. S. Weitz, “Disease dynamics in a stochastic
network game: a little empathy goes a long way in averting outbreaks,”
Scientific Reports, vol. 7, no. July 2016, p. 44122, 2017. [Online]. Available:
http://www.nature.com/articles/srep44122
[92] N. J. Watkins, C. Nowzari, and G. J. Pappas, “Inference, Prediction, and Control of
Networked Epidemics,” in IEEE American Control Conference, Seattle, WA, USA,
2017, pp. 5611 – 5616. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.07409
[93] M. Kretzschmar, Y. T. H. P. van Duynhoven, and A. J. Severijnen, “Modelling prevention strategies for Gonorrhea and Chlamydia using stochastic network simulations,”
American Journal of Epidemiology, vol. 144: 3, no. 3, pp. 306–317, 1996.

118

[94] A. Singh and J. P. Hespanha, “Moment closure techniques for stochastic models in
population biology,” American Control Conference, pp. 6—-pp, 2006.
[95] ——, “Approximate moment dynamics for chemically reacting systems,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control, vol. 56, no. 2, pp. 414–418, 2011.
[96] K. R. Ghusinga, M. Soltani, A. Lamperski, S. Dhople, and A. Singh, “Approximate
moment dynamics for polynomial and trigonometric stochastic systems,” arXiv preprint.
[97] M. Soltani, C. Vargas, N. Kumar, R. Kulkarni, and A. Singh, “Moment Closure
Approximations in a Genetic Negative Feedback Circuit,” p. 6, 2014. [Online].
Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.3958
[98] L. J. S. Allen, “Some Discrete-Time SI, SIR, and SIS Epidemic Models,” Mathematical
Biosciences, vol. 124, pp. 83–105, 1994.
[99] Z. Wang, D. W. C. Ho, and X. Liu, “H 1 H 1,” vol. 48, no. 7, pp. 1254–1258, 2003.
[100] F. Brauer, “The Kermack-McKendrick epidemic model revisited,” Mathematical Biosciences, vol. 198, no. 2, pp. 119–131, 2005.
[101] K. Drakopoulos, A. Ozdaglar, and J. Tsitsiklis, “An Efficient Curing Policy for Epidemics on Graphs,” IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering, vol. 1,
no. 2, pp. 67–75, 2014.
[102] P. Lee, A. Clark, B. Alomair, L. Bushnell, and R. Poovendran, “Adaptive Mitigation
of Multi-Virus Propagation: A Passivity-Based Approach,” vol. 5870, no. c, pp.
1–11, 2016. [Online]. Available: http://arxiv.org/abs/1603.04374
[103] A. R. Hota and S. Sundaram, “Optimal network topologies for mitigating security
and epidemic risks,” 54th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control,
and Computing, Allerton 2016, pp. 1129–1136, 2017.
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